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Abstract
Standard theory would predict that investors hold a well diversied portfolio of equities across the world
but despite the process of `nancial globalization', investors still hold a disproportionate share of lo-
cal equities in their portfolio: the `equity home bias' (French and Poterba (1991)). We review the
various explanations of this puzzling phenomenon in the context of recent developments in macroeco-
nomic modelling that have allowed to incorporate sophisticated international portfolio choices in standard
two-country general equilibrium models. We refer to this literature as Open Economy Financial Macro-
economics. We focus on three broad classes of explanations : (i) hedging motives in frictionless nancial
markets (real exchange rate and non-tradable income risk), (ii) asset trade costs in international nancial
markets (such as transaction costs, dierences in tax treatments between national and foreign assets...),
(iii) informational frictions and behavioural biases. These recent developments raise the need for new
portfolio facts beyond the equity home bias and we will present some new evidence on cross-border asset
holdings across dierent types of assets: equities, bonds and bank lending. We also present some new
micro data on institutional holdings of equity at the fund level. These data should inform macroeconomic
modelling of the open economy and a growing literature of models of delegated investment.
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1 Introduction
Standard nance theory would predict that investors hold a diversied portfolio of equities across the world
if capital is fully mobile across borders. Because foreign equities provide great diversication opportunities,
a point made early on in Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1974), falling barriers
to international trade in nancial assets over the last twenty-years should have led investors across the world
to re-balance their portfolio away from national assets towards foreign assets. The process of `nancial
globalization' fostered by capital account liberalizations, electronic trading, increasing exchanges of infor-
mation across borders and falling transaction costs has certainly led to a large increase in cross-border asset
trade (Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2003)). However, investors are still reluctant to reap the full benets
of international diversication and tend to hold a disproportionate share of local equities: the `home bias in
equities'. Since the seminal paper of French and Poterba (1991), the home bias in equities constitutes
one of the major puzzle in international nance. Despite better nancial integration, it has not decreased
sizably: in 2007, US investors still hold more than 80% percent of domestic equities, which is much higher
than the share of US equities in the world market portfolio and the home bias in equities is observed in all
developed countries.
Many explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain this very robust portfolio fact. We
will review these explanations looking at important recent developments on the subject. We do not intend
to provide a denite answer to the question or choose among alternative explanations, as they probably all
contribute to a part of the gap. Our goal is rather to explain where the theory stands and what might be the
next challenges ahead. We will distinguish between three broad classes of explanations : (i) hedging motives
in frictionless nancial markets (real exchange rate and non-tradable income risk), (ii) asset trade costs in
international nancial markets (such as transaction costs, dierences in tax treatments between national and
foreign assets...) and (iii) informational frictions and behavioural biases. We will review these explanations
in the context of the new developments in macroeconomic modelling of the open economy (we call this Open
Economy Financial Macroeconomics) and in the context of asymmetric information models, considering the
recent literature with endogenous information acquisition.
We will put some emphasis on the recent developments in the macro literature, which has embedded
non-trivial portfolio choices in standard two country general equilibrium macro models. Such developments
have been fostered by recent methodological breakthroughs that allow researchers in the eld to solve for
international portfolios in a broad class of macro models. The equity home bias has been one of the main
motivations for this literature which has traditionally focused on models with equities only. However, the
recent literature has put forward the importance of considering more sophisticated portfolio choices across
a wider class of assets (bonds, corporate debt, equity...). To x the ideas, we will develop a very standard
two country/two good DSGE model with endogenous portfolio choice: one with equity-only as in the early
literature and one with bonds and equity. This will allow us to present the recent methodological developments
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to fully characterize portfolios in this class of models and to show the limitations of the early literature. These
new developments also raise the need for new portfolio facts that these models with multiple asset classes
intend to replicate and we will present some new evidence on international holdings across dierent types
of assets: equities, bonds and banking assets. We focus on portfolio investment and abstract from Foreign
Direct Investment, as its determinants may be of a very dierent nature and are studied extensively in the
trade literature.
Finally, we present some new micro data on institutional holdings of equity at the fund level. These data
should inform both macroeconomic modelling of the open economy and also nance models of delegated
investment, which is a burgeoning literature and an important one as an increasing share of international
investment is intermediated.
In section 2, we present the standard denition of home equity bias and some recent measures across
countries and across time. In section 3, we focus on the recent methodological developments in the macroeco-
nomics literature (Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics). In section 4, we focus on the role of hedging
motives as a source of equity home bias. We do so using standard dynamic models of the Open Econ-
omy Financial Macroeconomics. In section 5, we review the literature on trade costs in nancial markets
(transaction costs, international taxation...). In section 6, we review the nance literature on information
asymmetries and behavioural biases. In section 7, in line with recent theoretical work, we present some new
evidence on aggregate portfolio holdings across a wider range of assets. We also present our new portfolio
facts at the fund level and discuss leads for further research. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Equity Home Bias : Denition and Measure
2.1 Denition
French and Poterba (1991) were the rst to our knowledge to document domestic ownership shares across
countries: they use data for the US, Japan, UK, France and Germany and show that for these countries,
investors hold a disproportionate share of domestic assets in their equity portfolios and there is very little
cross border equity diversication: in 1989, 92% of the US stock market is held by US residents. The
analogous numbers for Japan, UK, France and Germany are respectively 96%, 92%, 89% and 79%. They
label this pattern of the data as the equity home bias.1 This is a well-known puzzle in international nance:
in a world with frictionless nancial markets, the most basic International CAPM model with homogenous
investors across the world would predict that the representative investor of a given country should hold the
world market portfolio. In other words, the share of his nancial wealth invested in local equities should
be equal to the share of local equities in the world market portfolio, a prediction that contradicts the most
casual observation of the data on portfolio holdings. As a result, the measure of equity home bias (EHB)
1Bohn and Tesar (1996) estimate the share of foreign equities in the U.S. portfolio to be still very low in 1995, equal to
8 percent. Ahearne et al. (2004) estimate it to be slightly above 10% in 2000.
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that is most commonly used is the dierence between actual holdings of domestic equity and the share of
domestic equity in the world market portfolio:2
EHBi = 1  Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings
Share of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio
(1)
When the home bias measure for country i EHBi is equal to one, there is full equity home bias; when it
is equal to zero, the portfolio is optimally diversied according the the basic International CAPM.
2.2 Evidence across time and across countries
While one could argue that at the end of the eighties, international capital markets were far from being
frictionless, this might be a less valid explanation today. Despite an increased nancial integration, the
equity home bias remains a very pervasive phenomenon across countries and across time (classic surveys
include Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003). See also Sercu and Vanpee (2008) for recent
evidence). In gure (1), we show the evolution of home bias measures in developed countries across regions
of the world: it has decreased over the last twenty years with the process of `nancial globalization' but
remains still very high in all countries (see also table (1) for a recent snapshot of home bias measures for
selected countries). On average, the degree of home bias across the world is 0.63 (lower in Europe where
monetary union seemed to have had an eect but higher in other countries),3 meaning that the share of
foreign equities in investors portfolios less roughly a 1/3 of what it should be according to the most basic
International CAPM. In gure (2), we show the degree of home bias for emerging markets: emerging markets
have even much less diversied equity portfolios than developed countries; the average degree of home bias in
these countries is 0.9 (smaller in emerging Asia and larger in Latin America) and investors in these countries
hold 1/10 of the amount of foreign equities they should be holding according to basic International CAPM.
2See for instance Ahearne et al. (2004). Another commonly used measure in nance is a deviation from a benchmark
mean-variance portfolio. Benchmark portfolio weights are calculated from a mean variance optimisation problem with sample
estimates of the means and variance-covaraince matrix of returns. The main issue in the existing literature adopting the nance
approach are how to measure returns and covariance matrices. Papers dier in the extent to which they use real or nominal
returns, how they estimate expected returns and how they deal with structural breaks and nonstationarity. As a result, there
is a degree of heterogeneity in the estimates of expected returns and second moments.
3see Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) and Fidora et al. (2007) for studies on the impact of the Monetary Union on
cross-border equity diversication.
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Figure 1: Home Bias in Equities measures across developed countries (the country measure EHBi is Mar-
ket Capitalization-weighted for each region; source: IFS and FIBV. See appendix for the list of countries
included)
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Figure 2: Home Bias in Equities measures across emerging countries (the country measure EHBi is Mar-
ket Capitalization-weighted for each region; source: IFS and FIBV. See appendix for the list of countries
included)
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Domestic Market in % Share of Portfolio in Degree of Equity Home Bias
of World Market Capitalization Domestic Equity in % = EHBi
Source Country (1) (2) (3)
Australia 1.8 76.1 0.76
Brazil 1.6 99 0.98
China 7.8 99.2 0.99
Canada 2.7 80.2 0.80
Euro Area 13.5 57 0.625
Japan 8.9 73.5 0.71
South Africa 1.4 52 0.517
South Korea 1.4 89 0.88
Sweden 0.7 44 0.43
Switzerland 2.3 51 0.50
United Kingdom 5.1 54.5 0.52
United States 32.6 77.2 0.66
South Africa 32.6 88 0.88
Table (1): Home Bias in Equities in 2008 for selected countries (source IMF and FIBV)
Note: For Euro Area countries, within Euro Area cross-border equity holdings are considered as Foreign Equity Holdings.
This robust stylized fact has received considerable attention from both the nance literature and the
macroeconomics literature. The main dierence between these two sets of literature relies on some modelling
assumptions: the traditional nance literature has tried to rationalize the equity home bias in multi-country
models of portfolio choice where asset prices and their second moments are given (in particular in these models
the risk-free interest rate is exogenously given). The macro literature has tried to integrate international
portfolio decisions in otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models of the
international economy.4 These models have a fully general equilibrium structure and asset prices and their
second moments are endogenously determined. Asset holdings are a mean to share risks internationally and
to diversify optimally domestic output risks. The motivation is however the same: foreign equities seem to
oer diversication benets that are not reaped by investors and both types of literature aim to explain this
fact.5
The theoretical macro literature points towards potential gains from international diversication since
diversication could help to hedge national production risk. In the presence of imperfectly correlated pro-
ductivity shocks or output shocks across countries, owning foreign equity could help to smooth consumption.
This is most obvious in the context of a two country model with one single tradable good, as e.g. in Lucas
(1982): in such a world, domestic and foreign investors hold an identical portfolio of claims to output (eq-
uities), the market portfolio, thus diversifying optimally national output risks. As in the textbook nance
portfolio theory, in such a world the home bias in equities is seen as a failure of the standard diversication
4The dichotomy is not clear cut as some papers clearly bridges the two strands of literature and some nance papers discussed
in the paper do adopt the general equilibrium structure of macro DSGE models.
5The nance literature tends to focus on the diversication gains looking at asset price data and evaluate how an increase
in the share of foreign equities would improve the portfolio performance based on some criteria. The macro-nance literature
tends to use consumption data to measure the potential gains from international risk-sharing. We will discuss in section (6)
the question of the gains from international risk-sharing.
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motive. However, one should be cautious with such a statement: investors across the world would hold
the same portfolio, only if they were homogeneous. In reality, heterogeneity across investors from dierent
countries leads to departure from the world market portfolio and potentially a bias towards national assets.
Various sources of heterogeneity leading to equity home bias have been explored in the macro literature;
they fall in two broad classes of explanations : (i) hedging motives (real exchange rate risk and non-tradable
income risk), (ii) asset trade costs in international nancial markets (such as transaction costs, dierences in
tax treatments between national and foreign assets and other policy induced barriers to foreign investment...).
We will review in details these two explanations in section (4) and (5) but before doing so, we present how
recent methodological developments allow us to solve for (non-trivial) portfolio decisions in standard DSGE
models of the open economy: we label this recent literature Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics.
3 New Methodologies in Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics
3.1 Methodological Breakthrough
Until recently, most macroeconomic models of the international economy did not incorporate portfolio deci-
sions and rely mostly on the following asset structures: either one non-contingent bond traded internationally
or complete asset markets (through Arow-Debreu securities). None of these models could say anything about
gross foreign asset holdings and the way tradable assets can be used to share risks internationally. This was
mostly due to a technical diculty of solving for portfolios with more sophisticated nancial markets. Recent
methodological advances have allowed a much richer structure of asset trade to be examined.
Building on pertubation methods (see Judd (1998)), Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) develop a
solution method that allows standard linear solution techniques for macroeconomic models to be adapted
to solve for models with portfolio choice. Standard linear solution techniques cannot directly be applied
since these methods rely on a rst-order approximation around a deterministic steady state: to a rst order
approximation, assets are perfect substitutes, as they deliver the same expected return, so portfolio choice
is not pinned down. Devereux and Sutherland's work relies on several insights. Firstly, building on earlier
work by Judd and Guu (2001) and Samuelson (1970), they show that the steady state portfolio can be
derived as the portfolio in a noisy environment and letting the noise go to zero. Secondly, they show that in
order for the steady state portfolio to be well dened, a second order approximation of the portfolio equations
(Euler equations) needs to be considered, while only the rst order dynamics of the other equations of the
model are required to pin down steady state portfolios (also called zero order portfolio). Finally, the authors
show that the rst order dynamics of the model only depend on the steady state portfolio. In addition to
these conceptual insights, Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) also provides a formula for portfolio which
can be used to compute portfolios analytically in a fairly general class of models. In a companion paper,
Devereux and Sutherland (2007a), the authors show that in order to solve for the rst order dynamics
of the portfolio, a second order approximation of the non portfolio equations of the model is needed, while
the portfolio equations need to be approximated to the third order. Portfolio changes (around the steady
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state portfolios) are indeed driven by changes in second moments (third-order term) which drive changes in
expected returns across assets. It is then also true that the second order dynamics of the model depends on
the rst order dynamics of portfolios. The authors show that portfolios can again be computed analytically
in many cases.
In simultaneous work, Tille and van Wincoop (2008) develop a solution technique that is analogous
to the one presented in Devereux and Sutherland (2008a). The main dierence consists of the fact
that Tille and van Wincoop (2008) rely on numerical iterations to solve for portfolios, which requires
more computational eort, but also implies that their solution method can be applied to a wider class of
models. The main idea is however similar: steady state portfolios rely on a rst-order approximation of
the non-portfolio equations and a second-order approximation of the portfolio equations. Other recent work
that tackles the challenge of solving for portfolio choice are Evans and Hnatkovska (2006a and 2008)
and Judd et al. (2002). The methods developed in Evans and Hnatkovska (2008) and Judd et al.
(2002) can be applied to a very general class of models, but are quite complex and present a signicant
departure from standard DSGE solution methods.
3.2 Shortcomings and extensions
The main adavantage of the perturbation methods developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2008a)
are: (1) they are very easy to implement as very close to standard approximation methods used in DSGE
models; (2) they can be applied to broad range of environments (complete and incomplete markets models,
potentially large number of shocks and/or securities) (3) they provide (approximate) closed-from expressions
for portfolios in many cases. These methods face however some limitations as they rely on local approx-
imations around the deterministic steady-state: as any local methods, they are valid around the point of
approximation, which can raise some concerns in presence of large deviations away from this point. This can
arise for instance in presence of large shocks (for instance disaster risks as in Barro (2006)) or when the
problem is non-stationary (models of incomplete markets for instance where the distribution of wealth across
countries might have a unit-root). Since the methods are mainly based on rst and second order approx-
imations, they might also be inaccurate in models that exhibit strong non-linearities, such as models with
borrowing constraints. Lastly, the approximation of the decision rules in these methods is made around the
deterministic steady-state. However, the deterministic steady-state might not be the stationary steady-state
of the model in presence of risk. Coeurdacier, Rey and Winant (2010) suggest to use perturbation
methods around the \risky steady-state, point where agents choose to stay at a given date if they expect
future risk and if the realization of shocks is 0 at this date". While still local, such a method should be more
accurate when decision rules in presence of risk are signicantly dierent from the one obtained when risk
goes towards zero (as in Devereux and Sutherland (2008a)). The question of accuracy of these solution
methods cannot be easily tackled as for most models for which they are implemented, one cannot provide ex-
act numerical methods. Exceptions of two-country/two goods models where solutions can be found without
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approximations are models with log-linear preferences as in Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, 2010a,b).6
Ultimately, one should expect the development of \global methods" to emerge in order to solve portfolio
choice models with multiple agents, multiple goods and multiple securities. These are useful venues for future
research as they might be adequate in some environments where standard perturbation methods might fail
and they will also provide insights on the accuracy of perturbation methods. Recent work in that direction
includes Dumas and Lyaso (2010) in nite-horizons models and Chien, Cole and Lustig (2011) in
a one-good closed economy model with multiple agents. Extending these methods to standard international
macro models is a next important step.
However, despite their limitations, these perturbation methods still constitute a major improvement
which makes it possible to incorporate non-trivial portfolio choice in models of the open macroeconomy.
These methodological improvements have generated a recent explosion of the literature to investigate the
origins of portfolio biases. A rst generation of models of Open Financial Macroeconomics has looked at
the hedging of real exchange rate risk and non-tradable income risk as a source of portfolio biases in models
with equities only. A second generation of models has emphasized the importance of describing portfolios
with a richer menu of assets and has developed models with multiple asset classes (bonds and equities). We
will review these two strands of literature sequentially in the next section.
4 Hedging motives in Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics
Hedging motives lead to departure from the benchmark model of Lucas (1982) where homogeneous investors
across the world hold identical portfolios. By hedging motives, we mean choosing nancial claims that help
insulate investors from sources of risk aecting their income streams. The sources of risk developed in the
literature are the following:
- Real exchange rate risk: the prices of investors' consumption goods uctuate which aects the purchasing
power of their income.
- Non-tradable income risk: investors have a part of their income (in the form of wages in particular)
that cannot be traded in nancial markets.7
In other words, because investors in dierent countries have dierent exposure to real exchange rate risk
and/or to non-tradable income risk, they will hold dierent equity portfolios in equilibrium. It is important
to understand that in these cases, equity portfolio biases are neither inecient nor the consequence of some
frictions in nancial markets. The hedging of domestic sources of risks leads to dierent optimal portfolios
across borders but perfect (or almost perfect) risk-sharing can still be preserved.
6See also Devereux and Saito (2005). As Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, 2010ab), Devereux and Saito (2005)
use a continuous time framework which allows some analytical solutions to be derived, but it can only be applied to a very
restricted class of models.
7The presence of government spending shocks can also generate a source of non-tradable income risk due to tax changes.
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In order to anylize how these hedging motives aect equity portfolios, we present a benchmark two-
country/two good model when the only traded asset is equity. We show how log-linearization techniques can
be used to derive (zero-order) steady-state portfolios. We also revisit some of the results of the literature
regarding the hedging of real exchange rate risk and non-tradable income risk in an equity only model. In
particular, we show the diculties to rationalize the equity home bias in such a framework. In section (4.2),
we will show how a multiple asset class model provides an answer to most of these diculties.
4.1 Hedging motives in a benchmark model with equities only
4.1.1 Set-up and First Order Conditions
There are two symmetric countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), each with a representative household.
Country i = H;F produces one good using labor and capital. We assume that capital is xed for now and
will allow for endogenous capital accumulation in the subsequent section (4.2). All markets are perfectly
competitive.
Preferences
Country i is inhabited by a representative household who has the following life-time utility function:
E0
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 i;t
1    
l1+!i;t
1 + !
!
; (2)
where ! is the Frish-elasticity of labor supply (! > 0) and  the relative risk aversion parameter ( > 0).
Ci;t is i's aggregate consumption in period t and li;t is labor eort. Ci;t is a composite good given by:
Ci;t =
h
a1=
 
cii;t
( 1)=
+ (1  a)1=  cij;t( 1)=i=( 1) ; with j 6= i; (3)
where cij;t is country i's consumption of the good produced by country j at date t.  > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between the two goods. In the (symmetric) deterministic steady state, a is the share of
consumption spending devoted to the local good. We assume a preference bias for local goods, 12 < a < 1.
The welfare based consumer price index that corresponds to these preferences is:
Pi;t =
h
a (pi;t)
1 
+ (1  a) (pj;t)1 
i1=(1 )
; j 6= i; (4)
where pi;t is the price of good i.
Technologies and rms' decisions
In period t, country produces yi;t units of good i according to the production function
yi;t = i;t (k0)

(li;t)
1 ; (5)
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with 0 <  < 1: k0 is the country's initial stock of capital. It is xed. Total factor productivity (TFP)
i;t > 0 is an exogenous random variable.
There is a (representative) rm in country i that hires local labor and produces output, using technology
(5). Due to the Cobb-Douglas technology, a share 1  of output at market prices is paid to workers. Thus,
the country i wage incomes are:
wi;tli;t = (1  )pi;tyi;t (6)
where wi;t is the country i wage rate.
A share  of country i output at market prices is paid as a dividend di;t to shareholders:
di;t = pi;tyi;t (7)
Financial markets and instantaneous budget constraint
Financial markets are frictionless. There is international trade in stocks. The country i rm issues a
stock that represents a claim to its stream of dividends fdi;tg. The supply of shares is normalized at unity.
Each household fully owns the local stock, at birth, and has zero initial foreign assets. Let Sij;t+1 denote the
number of shares of stock j held by country i at the end of period t. At date t, the country i household faces
the following budget constraint:
Pi;tCi;t + p
S
i;tS
i
i;t+1 + p
S
j;tS
i
j;t+1 = wi;tli;t + (di;t + p
S
i;t)S
i
i;t + (dj;t + p
S
j;t)S
i
j;t; j 6= i; (8)
where pSi;t is the price of stock i:
Household decisions and market clearing conditions
Each household selects portfolios, consumptions and labor supplies that maximize her life-time utility
(2) subject to her budget constraint (8) for t  0. The following equations are rst-order conditions of that
decision problem:
cii;t = a

pi;t
Pi;t
 
Ci;t; c
i
j;t = (1  a)

pj;t
Pi;t
 
Ci;t; l
!
i;t =

wi;t
Pi;t

Ci;t
  (9)
1 = Et

Ci;t+1
Ci;t
 
Pi;t
Pi;t+1
pSj;t+1 + dj;t+1
pSj;t
; for j = H;F . (10)
(9) represents the optimal allocation of consumption spending across goods, and the labor supply decision.
(10) shows the Euler equations with respect to the two stocks.
Market-clearing in goods and asset markets requires:
cHH;t + c
F
H;t = yH;t ; c
F
F;t + c
H
F;t = yF;t ; (11)
SHH;t + S
F
H;t = S
F
F;t + S
H
F;t = 1 (12)
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4.1.2 Zero-order equilibrium portfolios
Equilibrium portfolio holdings chosen at date t (Sii;t+1; S
i
j;t+1) are functions of state variables at date
t. Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) show how to compute Taylor expansion of the portfolio decision
rules, in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. In this Section, we provide closed form solutions
for `zero-order portfolios' (denoted by variables without time subscripts) Sii ; S
i
j ; i.e. portfolio decision rules
evaluated at steady state values of state variables. These portfolios can be determined by linearizing the
model around its deterministic steady state. We show that the asset structure here (two assets with two
exogenous shocks) is \locally-complete" in the sense that up to a rst order linear approximation, the
consumption allocation is ecient (perfect risk sharing allocation up to a rst-order approximation of the
model). The method we use to solve for portfolios is then slightly dierent from Devereux and Sutherland
(2008a) as it does not require a second-order expansion of the Euler equations (equation ((10)). We simply
derive the portfolio that replicates the ecient allocation up to a rst-order approximation of the non-
portfolio equations. This method is simpler but less general than Devereux and Sutherland (2008a)
which can still be applied in models with incomplete nancial markets.
Log-linearization of the model
In what follows, zt  zH;tzF;t denotes the ratio of Home over Foreign variables; bzt  (zt   z)=z denotes the
relative deviation of a variable zt from its steady state value z.
The Home country's CPI-based real exchange is RERt  PH;tPF;t . Linearizing this expression gives (using
(4)):
\RERt = dPH;t  dPF;t = (2a  1) bqt: (13)
where qt  pH;t=pF;t denotes the country H terms of trade. Due to consumption home bias (a > 12 ), an
improvement of the Home terms of trade generates an appreciation of the Home real exchange rate (without
home bias in consumption, the real exchange rate is constant).
In an equilibrium with \locally-complete" markets, the ratio of Home and Foreign marginal utilities of
aggregate consumption is proportional to the consumption-based real exchange rate (Backus and Smith
(1993), Kollmann (1995)). Linearization of this risk sharing condition gives:
 (dCH;t  dCF;t) = (2a  1) bqt: (14)
Using intratemporal rst-order condition for consumption (9) and market-clearing condition (11), one
can show that when (14) holds, relative world consumption demand for the Home good yt = yH;t=yF;t 
(cHH;t + c
F
H;t)=(c
F
F;t + c
H
F;t) satises in log-linearized terms:
8
byt =   1  (2a  1)2+ (2a  1)2 1

 bqt   bqt (15)
8See Coeurdacier (2009) and Coeurdacier, Kollmann, Martin (2007) for similar expressions.
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where   (1   (2a  1)2) + (2a 1)2 > 0. Thus Home terms of trade worsen when the relative supply of
Home goods increases as Foreign goods are scarcer.
Ex-ante symmetry implies that the zero-order portfolios have to satisfy these conditions: S  SHH =
SFF = 1   SFH = 1   SHF ; S describes the (zero-order) equilibrium equity portfolio. Note that S denotes a
country's holdings of local stock.
We will show that there exists a unique portfolio S that satises the following 'static' budget constraint,
for consumptions that are consistent with the linearized risk sharing condition (14):
Pi;tCi;t = wi;tli;t + Sdi;t + (1  S)dj;t, for i = H;F: (16)
Thus (up to rst order), ecient country i consumption spending at date t equals date t wage income, wi;tli;t;
plus the nancial income generated by the equity portfolio S:9
Subtracting the 'static' budget constraint of country F from that of country H and using the risk-sharing
condition (14) yields the following log-linearized `static' budget constraint:
( \PH;tCH;t   \PF;tCF;t) = (1  1

)(2a  1) bqt| {z }
\RERt
= (1  )dwtlt + (2S   1)bdt (17)
where dwtlt  \wH;tlH;t   \wF;tlF;t denotes relative labor income and bdt  ddH;t  ddF;t denotes the relative
dividend.
This expression shows the changes in country H income (relative to the income of F ) necessary to nance
the consumption consistent with ecient risk-sharing (up to rst order).
Partial equilibrium zero-order portfolios
The `static' budget constraint is useful to derive the equilibrium portfolio as a function of variance/covariance
ratios; indeed, taking the covariance with bdt in (17) gives the following portfolio (here we implicitly assume
that the equity portfolio supports ecient risk-sharing up to a rst-order, which is veried below):
S =
1
2
  1
2
1  

cov(dwtlt; bdt)
var(bdt) + 12 (1 
1
 )

cov([RER; bdt)
var(bdt) (18)
This expression holds in many class of models (with equity only) as we only need the budget constraints
and generic rst order conditions to derive it. It is the departure of many empirical studies (note that the
same expression also holds in terms of returns instead of income ows).
The portfolio departs from the fully diversied one with weights 1=2 in both equities (as in Lucas (1982))
in presence of labor income risk and/or real exchange rate risk. It tells us that investors would favor local
equity if:
9Kollmann (2006b) and Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2010) shows that if this 'static' budget constraint
holds, then the present value budget constraint of country i is likewise satised, up to a rst order.
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(i) Relative dividends covary negatively with (relative) labor income (the term cov(
dwtlt; bdt)
var( bdt) ). This term is
referred as the hedging of non-tradable income risk.
As as labor income accounts for more than 2/3 of total income, this term might lead to potentially large
portfolio biases (the covariance term being multiplied by 1  ). Since households cannot trade nancial
claims on their labor incomes and will use existing nancial assets to hedge this non-tradable income risk.
The main intuition is the following: households want to insure themselves against a fall in their labor incomes
and in the returns to their human wealth by holding nancial assets that have higher returns in these bad
states. If local equities have higher returns (than abroad) when local returns to non-tradable wealth are
lower (than abroad), they will bias their portfolio towards local equities.
(ii) Relative dividends covary positively with the real exchange rate if  > 1 (the term cov(
\RER; bdt)
var( bdt) ).
This term is referred as the hedging of real exchange rate risk. The optimal hedging of real exchange
rate risk depends on two forces going in opposite direction: when local goods are more expensive, consumers
need to generate more income in order to stabilize their purchasing power. On the other hand, since local
goods are more expensive, households could be better o consuming when goods are cheaper. The dominating
eect depends on how much households want to smooth their consumption across states. For consumers
suciently risk-averse ( > 1), the former eect dominates and households want to increase their income
when their consumption goods are more expensive. Thus, they build their portfolio by choosing assets with
a high pay-o when local goods are expensive. For the log-investor ( = 1), the two eects cancel out and
the hedging term disappears.
General equilibrium zero-order portfolios
Note that expression (18) is a partial equilibrium expression. In general equilibrium macro models, the
above variance/covariance can be expressed as a function of the underlying parameters of the model. Since
labor income and dividends are a constant share of output ((6) and (7)), relative labor income (dwtlt) and
dividends (bdt) are equal and given by: dwtlt = bdt = bqt + byt.
Substituting into (17) and using (15) gives:
(1  1

) (2a  1) bqt = f(1  ) +  (2S   1)g (bqt + byt) = f(1  ) +  (2S   1)g (1  )bqt (19)
The asset structure supports full risk sharing, up to rst-order, if (19) holds for all realizations of the (relative)
exogenous productivity shocks (bt) (or equivalently all realizations of the terms-of-trade bqt). The following
portfolio S ensures that (19) holds for arbitrary realizations of bqt:
S =
1
2
  1
2
1  

  1
2
(1  1

)
(2a  1)
 (  1) (20)
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The portfolio is the sum of three terms:
(i) The rst term 12 is a pure diversication term. It would prevail if there were no hedging motives as in
Lucas (1982). In the absence of heterogeneity across investors, there is full diversication of national
output risk. We derive the Lucas portfolio when ! 1 (no human capital risk) and when a = 1=2 (no
real exchange rate risk).
(ii) The second term   12 1  is the hedging of non-tradable income risk (as in Baxter and Jermann
(1997)): changes in output driven by productivity shocks are shared in constant proportion (Cobb-
Douglas production). This leads to a perfect correlation between labor incomes and capital incomes:
households should short the local stock to hedge human capital risk. Note that in the present model,
the portfolio is exactly the one of Baxter and Jermann (1997) in the absence of real exchange rate
risk (a = 1=2).
(iii) The third term   12 (1   1 ) (2a 1)( 1) is the hedging of real exchange rate risk. This term is the same as
the one derived in Coeurdacier (2009) and Kollmann (2006b) in the absence of human capital
risk ( ! 1). This term cancels out for a log-investor ( = 1). As explained above (see equation
(18)), investors bias their portfolio towards equities that have high returns when local goods are more
expensive (if  > 1). The appropriate asset depends on the value of  i.e on the elasticity of substitution
. Three dierent cases emerge:
(a)  > 1 (i.e. an elasticity of substitution  roughly above unity): the hedging of real exchange
rate risk generates a Foreign equity bias. The reason is the following: a (relative) fall in local
output driven by a bad productivity shock triggers an increase in the Home terms-of-trade, an
appreciation of the Home real exchange rate together with a decrease in Home equity returns:
Foreign equities are more cherished by Home investors since they have higher returns when the
Home real exchange rate appreciates.
(b)  < 1 (i.e. elasticity of substitution , roughly below unity): a (relative) fall in local output
triggers a stronger improvement of the Home terms-of-trade and a stronger appreciation of the
Home real exchange rate. As the relative price response is stronger, Home equity excess returns
increase : Home investors exhibit Home equity bias as Home equity have higher returns when the
Home real exchange rate appreciates. This is the case emphasized by Kollmann (2006b).
(c)  = 1: Any increase in local output is perfectly oset by a fall in the terms-of-trade. Both
equities are perfect substitutes and there is portfolio indeterminacy. This is an extension of Cole
and Obstfeld (1991)'s result.
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4.1.3 Related literature
Hedging real exchange rate risk
As in appears clearly in the previous model, optimal portfolios are structured to hedge the risk arising
from real exchange rate uctuations. This is at the heart of the potential divergence of portfolios across
investors in the partial equilibrium portfolio choice models with real exchange rate risk. The key issue is
whether local equities are a good hedge against relative price (real exchange rate) uctuations, i.e. whether
local equities have higher returns when local goods are (relatively) more expensive. If this is the case, then
local investors should favor local equities. Early examples of this hypothesis are Solnik (1974), Adler
and Dumas (1983), Krugman (1981), de Macedo (1983), de Macedo et al. (1985) and Stulz
(1981). Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) start with the premise that for equity home bias to be rooted
in a desire to hedge against relative ination, equity returns need to be positively correlated with ination.
They test for such a correlation and reject it for all countries considered. These early papers take relative
prices (and the real exchange rate) and asset returns as given while in the present model and the recent
Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics, the dynamics of goods prices and asset returns is endogenous,
and so is the covariance between the two.
In the more recent literature, one can distinguish among contributions that focus on the hedging of the
relative price of tradables (terms-of-trade, as in the present model) and those that focus on the hedging of
the relative price of non-tradable goods.
Let us start with the former as they are directly related to the present model. In their inuential
contribution, Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) argue that trade costs in goods markets should help to solve
the equity home bias puzzle. The present model (in line with Coeurdacier (2009))10 shows the opposite
result for most parameters values (in particular for  and  above unity). Indeed, in Obstfeld and Rogo
(2000), the coecient of risk aversion is below unity (and equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between the two goods) as for such calibration one can solve in closed-form without any approximation. With
such preferences, the agents prefer to hold local equities which pay less when local consumption is expensive.
A similar point is made by Uppal (1993) in a two country/one good model in continuous time with trade
costs: he shows that home bias only arises for the coecient of relative risk aversion smaller than one. One
can potentially restore the argument of Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) in the present model if  is above
1 but the elasticity of subsitituion between goods () is below unity. In that case, a fall in Home supply
triggers a very large increase in the Home terms-of-trade such that Home equity returns are precisely high
when prices of Home goods are high. Hence, investors would rather hold local equities. This is the point
made by Kollmann (2006b): he develops a two country, two good, endowment economy with home bias
in consumption and shows that with a suitably low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
10The present models feature home bias in preferences instead of trade costs as in Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) and
Coeurdacier (2009). A functional transformation of trade costs would however makes the two models isomorphic.
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goods the model can produce home bias in equities. Hence, in this class of models, equity home bias relies on
the response of relative prices, i.e. on the elasticity of substitution between local and foreign products. While
time series macro data estimating the response of trade to exchange rate changes suggests a low elasticity
of substitution, between 0.5 and 1.5 (see Hooper and Marques (1995), Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002)), bilateral sectoral trade data suggests a large elasticity, above
5 for most sectors (see Harrigan (1993), Hummels (2001) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) among
others).11 The parameter uncertainty makes it hard to get a conclusive answer from this class of models. It
is also important to note that output uctuations in all these classes of models are driven by supply shocks.
In the presence of demand shocks, equilibrium portfolios could turn out to be dierent: when local demand
is high, both prices of local goods and payos of local rms increase. Hence, demand shocks can generate
positive co-movements between local equity returns and the price of local goods (see Pavlova and Rigobon
(2007)). In order to be able to consume when demand is high, local investors would prefer local equities.
The presence of nontradable consumption also exposes domestic agents to a source of real exchange
rate risk (driven by uctuations in the price of non-tradable goods). Stockman and Dellas (1989)
develops a two country model with endowment economies. Each country produces a (single) traded good
and a nontraded good. The sources of uncertainty are shocks to the endowments of traded and nontraded
goods. There is trade in the equities of tradable and nontradable goods rm. The authors show that
with utility separable in tradable and nontradable consumption, optimal portfolios imply that domestic
agents hold all of the equity of domestic nontradable rms. This is because by holding all of the equity of
nontraded goods, domestic agents hold an asset whose return is perfectly correlated with their expenditure
on nontraded goods. Domestic agents hold the same share of Home and Foreign equity of tradable rms,
implying perfect diversication in the tradable sector as in Lucas (1982). Thus, this model generates home
bias in equity positions, and the home bias increases in the share of nontradable consumption in total output.
Various papers have extended the framework of Stockman and Dellas (1989) to more general preferences,
investigating in particular the non-separability between tradable and non-tradable consumption together
with multiple tradable goods (see Baxter et al (1998), Serrat (2001),12 Obstfeld (2007), Matsumoto
(2007), Collard et al. (2007))13. In these papers, the presence of nontradable consumption interacts
with tradable consumption and more or less than full home bias in nontradable equities obtains. The precise
structure of portfolios is strongly dependent on preference parameters, and in particular the substitution
elasticities between tradable and nontradable goods (and also between domestic and foreign tradable goods).
11A recent paper by Imbs and Mejean (2009) claims that the discrepancy between macro and micro estimates comes from
an aggregation bias; correcting for this bias, they nd an elasticity up to 7 in line with the trade evidence.
12See also Kollmann (2006a) for a comment.
13In earlier work, Eldor et al. (1988) in a general equilibrium model with n countries, each producing a nontradable
good and the single tradable good that is consumed in all countries. The assets traded are "real equities" for the tradable
and nontradable good. Tradable equities pay one unit of the traded good in each state of the world, while nontradable equity
pays out  units of the nontradable good, where  is state contingent nontradable output. They point out that for home bias
to arise the returns of nontraded equities have to be positively correlated with the price of the nontradable good and derive
conditions for the risk aversion parameter, the price elasticity of demand for tradable goods and the income elasticity of demand
for tradable goods such that it would be the case.
16
The mechanism at heart of the home bias towards non-tradable equity is however essentially similar to the one
described in the previous model: investors want to hold equities that pay high when the real exchange rate
appreciates, i.e when the consumption of non-tradable goods is expensive. It turns out that for a suciently
low elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods (roughly below unity as found in the
empirical literature),14 a fall in local non-tradable output implies a strong increase the relative price of
non-tradable goods together with an increase in local non-tradable equity returns: hence, local non-tradable
equity returns comove positively with the price of non-tradable goods (and the real exchange rate), leading
to local equity bias in that sector. On the empirical front, Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) derive an
expression that relates home bias to the correlation between equity returns and nontradable consumption
growth15 and using data on 14 OECD countries from 1970 to 1993, they nd that, on average, nontradables
consumption growth is positively correlated with the return on domestic capital. This would imply that
home bias would arise if tradables and nontradable goods are complementary. The authors nd, however,
that even in those cases, hedging nontradables consumption could at best explain a relatively small fraction
of the home bias observed in the data. Overall, there are two empirical diculties with an explanation of
the equity home bias relying on the presence of a non-tradable sector. The rst one is that the structure
of portfolios is strongly dependent on preference parameters, which are not easy to estimate. The second
one is that the home bias result relies on the ability of investors to hold separate claims on tradable and
non-tradable output: as most products contain both tradable and non-tradable components, shares of rms
automatically involve joint claims on tradables and non-tradables. This diculty is all the more relevant
that, when agents are allowed to trade separate claims on tradable and non-tradable output, optimal equity
positions are very dierent across the two sectors. This dierent structure of portfolios across traded and
non-traded sectors seems \inconsistent with casual empiricism" as argued by Lewis (1999). More broadly,
ampirical analysis of this channel is also hindered by the diculty to identify nontradable consumption and
tradable/nontradable equity.
As argued above, portfolios in these models results are highly dependent on some preference parameters
(risk aversion and substitution elasticities across goods). If one wants to believe the parameters are such that
the model delivers equity home bias, such an explanation would still face a major empirical issue: the hedging
of real exchange rate risk leads to equity home bias if local equities have higher returns (than abroad) when
local prices are higher (than abroad). In other words, equity home bias appears if excess local equity returns
(over foreign) increase when the real exchange rate appreciates (the term cov(
\RER; bdt)
var( bdt) in equation (18)). As
shown by van Wincoop and Warnock (2008), the empirical correlation between excess equity returns
and the real exchange rate is very low, too low to explain observed equity home bias. Furthermore, most of
the uctuations in the real exchange rate represent uctuations in the nominal exchange rate: as explained
in section (4.2), this could be easily hedged using positions in the forward currency market or the currency
14Typical values used for the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods are: 0.44 (Stockman and
Tesar (1995)), 0.74 (Mendoza (1995)), from 0.6 to 0.8 (Serrat (2001)). Ostry and Reinhart (1992) provides estimates
for developing countries in the range of 0.6 to 1.4. See Matsumoto (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
15Note that their model also includes leisure which drives another hedging motive.
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bond market. In other words, equities do not seem empirically to be an appropriate asset to insure investors
against real exchange rate uctuations. Hence, while these models are theoretically appealing, there is now
a consensus that the hedging of real exchange rate risk cannot account empirically for the equity home bias.
Hedging non-tradable income risk
As in our model (see equation (18)), the hedging of non-tradable income risk implies to favour stocks
which have higher pay-os when labour incomes are low. The focus of previous literature has been twofold:
rst, from a theoretical perspective, the literature has discussed the conditions under which standard macro-
economic models imply a negative or positive correlation between local equity returns and returns to non-
tradable wealth. Second, from an empirical perspective, a series of papers have provided estimates of the
covariance between relative equity returns and relative returns to human wealth which is the key empirical
counterpart of portfolio biases in this class of models.
The rst and most inuential contribution in this literature is Baxter and Jermann (1997). As in
the present model, they argue that the presence of non-tradable income risk worsens the equity home bias
puzzle. Their argument goes as follows: in a standard N-country real business cycle model with a single
tradable good and a Cobb-Douglas production function using capital and labor, changes in output are shared
in constant proportion between capital and labor. Hence, labor and capital incomes are perfectly correlated
in this class of models. As investors are already strongly exposed to domestic risk due to their labor income,
they should not hold local capital whose returns move in lock-steps with returns to human wealth. Due to
the relatively large labour share in all countries, the eects of hedging domestic human capital dominate
the benets of diversication: investors should short-sell local equities and diversify their non-tradable risk
by holding foreign equities (term   12 1  in equation (20)). The equity home bias puzzle is worse than we
think! The authors then estimate a vector error correction model that allows the correlation between labour
and capital returns to vary over time and be imperfect, while maintaining the assumption that the ratio
of labour to capital income is stationary. Using data from the OECD National Accounts (1994) for Japan,
UK, Germany, and US for 1960-1993, they nd that within countries, labour and capital returns are highly
correlated, while the correlation between domestic labour returns and foreign equity returns is quite low.
Using the observed correlations, the authors then construct diversied portfolios and nd that the optimal
position in domestic equity is negative in all the countries considered.
Their empirical ndings have been challenged by a series of papers : Bottazzi et al (1996) use a
continuous time VAR model of portfolio choice and data on a large set of OECD countries and nd that
returns to domestic capital and human capital are negatively correlated for most countries but the US and
this can explain a reasonable fraction of equity home bias in these countries. Julliard (2002) argues that
the Baxter and Jermann (1997)'s empirical ndings are due to an econometric misspecication : the
correlation between returns to human capital and local equity returns is overstated in Baxter and Jermann
(1997) because they implicitly assume that innovations to capital and labor incomes are independent across
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countries. Once the misspecication is corrected, considering human capital risk does not unequivocally
worsen the home bias puzzle. Using micro-level data, Massa and Simonov (2006) show that non-nancial
income is uncorrelated with the market portfolio of nancial assets, but actual investors' portfolios (which
dier from the market portfolio) are more positively correlated with non-nancial income than the market
portfolio is. Thus, the authors cast doubt on the rationality of investors and on their desire to hedge
non-tradable income risk.
From a theoretical perspective, Heathcote and Perri (2008) shows that Baxter and Jermann
(1997)'s result relies on a very strong assumption: one single and perfectly tradable good. Relaxing this
hypothesis (in a two-country/two-good international RBC model a la Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1994)) and introducing dierentiated product across countries together with consumption/investment home
bias changes drastically the picture and helps solving the equity home bias puzzle. Their result relies on
two key elements: endogenous capital accumulation and a strong adjustment of relative prices.16 The main
intuition goes as follows: suppose a positive (persistent) productivity shock hits the Home economy. This
leads to:
(i) a fall in the relative price of Home goods (Foreign goods are scarcer).
(ii) an increase in Home investment (more than abroad) as Home investment uses more intensively cheaper
Home goods (due to home bias in investment spending).
(iii) an increase in Home wage incomes (more than abroad) and in the returns on non-tradable wealth.
(iv) A decrease in the returns on Home capital (relative to Foreign) if the (relative) price response of
Home goods is strong enough.
The main dierence with Baxter and Jermann (1997) is the last point (iv): excess returns on Home
capital fall following a positive productivity shock if the adjustment of (relative) prices is large enough.
Indeed, if the market price of Home goods falls suciently and Home investment is increasing, dividends
distributed by Home rms (which are net of investment) are lower than abroad, and so are Home returns to
capital. Hence the model generates negative co-movements between Home (excess) returns to human wealth
and Home (excess) returns to capital and hedging non-tradable income risk leads to home bias in equities.
Home bias in investment/consumption spending is important as it triggers a stronger response of investment
at Home, thus a larger fall of Home dividends and a larger increase of Home wages. Importantly, the model
generates a positive link between consumption home bias and equity home bias as found in the data.17
Note that Heathcote and Perri (2008) focus on log-utility and unitary elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign goods. Relaxing these hypothesis aects the optimal equity portfolio: increasing the
level of risk aversion introduces a real exchange rate risk motive as in Coeurdacier (2009) and Kollmann
(2006b). Increasing the elasticity of substitution reduces the response of relative prices and makes the
16Our model shows the importance of endogenous capital accumulation: despite multiple goods, Baxter and Jermann
(1997)'s results survive with xed capital.
17Lane (2000), Aizenman and Noy (2004), Heathcote and Perri (2008) among others show a positive relationship
between trade openness and foreign equity holdings looking at a cross section of countries. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007)
and Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2008) show that country equity portfolios are strongly biased towards trading partners.
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portfolio converging towards the one of Baxter and Jermann (1997).
4.2 Hedging motives in a benchmark model with multiple asset classes (bonds
and equities)
4.2.1 Hedging with bond and equities: the role of "conditional risk"
The rst generation of papers presented above focus on equity positions to rationalize the home bias. How-
ever, equities are only a part of nancial assets traded internationally. Debt securities (nominal bonds in
dierent currencies, corporate bonds...) are instruments that can also be used to share risks internationally
(see section (7)). There are no reasons to exclude them from the models, rst for realism, since they constitute
a large share of international asset ows but above all because there might be substitution across asset classes.
Hence, the equity positions derived in equity only models might be sensitive to the presence of other nancial
assets. Recent models with portfolio decisions have been incorporating multiple assets (equities and bonds) to
have more robust and realistic predictions. As described in section (4.2.5), recent contributions with multiple
asset classes include among others: Engel and Matsumoto (2008a,b), Coeurdacier, Kollmann and
Martin (2007 and 2010), Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2010), Berriel and Bhattarai (2008),
Devereux and Sutherland (2007 and 2008b). As argued by Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2010),
a key motivation for introducing bonds in the models is that nominal bonds returns dierentials across
countries are (almost) perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate (in developed countries, uctuations
in the nominal exchange rate account for most of the uctuations in the real exchange rate). Hence, bonds
seem to be better suited than equities to hedge real exchange rate risk. But this is not the end of the story.
The presence of bonds also aects the hedging properties of equities for non-tradable income risk. Equities
are used to hedge sources of risks that cannot be hedged through the bond positions, in particular the part
of non-tradable income risk that is orthogonal to bond returns. Contrary to the previous literature on the
hedging of human capital, in these recent papers, the optimal equity position depends on the correlation of
returns on equity with returns on non-tradable income, conditional on bond returns.
4.2.2 Set-up of the Model
We use a similar set up as in section (4.1) but we add two important ingredients to formalize our above
discussion on hedging motives: endogenous capital accumulation and trade in real bonds. They allow us to
overcome the limitations of the model presented in (4.1): rst, endogenous investment in a two-good model
breaks the perfect link between returns on physical capital and returns on human capital; second, bond
trading modies the hedging properties of equities: bonds will be used to hedge uctuations in the real
exchange rate. Equities will be used to hedge non-tradable income risk, conditionally on bond returns.
This model is similar Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2010) which extends Heathcote and Perri
(2008) to multiple asset classes (bonds and equities).
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In presence of productivity shocks only, we would face a portfolio indeterminacy in a rst-order ap-
proximation of the non-portfolio equations since the number of available assets (bonds and equities in each
country) would exceed the exogenous sources of uncertainty. We have to add an additional source of uncer-
tainty. We choose to add shocks to the disutility of leisure for simplicity but as explained in Coeurdacier,
Kollmann and Martin (2010), the nature of the additional shock used to alleviate the portfolio inde-
terminacy is irrelevant for the portfolio and results would survive with other supply shocks commonly used
(shocks to investment a la Greenwood, Hercowitz and Human (1988), depreciation shocks, shocks
to capacity utilization...).18
Hence, preferences are now dened by:
E0
1X
t=0
t
 
C1 i;t
1     i;t
l1+!i;t
1 + !
!
; (21)
where i;t is an exogenous shock to the disutility of labor.
Technologies and capital accumulation
As before, production in each country uses capital and labor with a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yi;t = i;t (ki;t)

(li;t)
1 ; (22)
The law of motion of the capital stock is:
ki;t+1 = (1  )ki;t + Ii;t (23)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. Ii;t is gross investment in country i at date t: In both
countries, gross investment is generated using Home and Foreign inputs:
Ii;t =
h
a1=
 
iii;t
( 1)=
+ (1  a)1=  iij;t( 1)=i=( 1) ; j 6= i; (24)
where iij;t is the amount of good j used for investment in country i. We assume local bias for investment
spending (identical to the one for consumption),19 12 < a < 1: The associated investment price index is the
same as for consumption Pi;t (see equation (4)).
18Needless to say that a dierent shock will have dierent business cycles implications but this is not the purpose of the
present model.
19See Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2009) and Castello (2009) for a model where bias in investment spending
is dierent to the bias in consumption spending.
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Firms' decisions
A share 1    of output at market prices is paid to workers as in equation (6). A share  of country i
output, net of physical investment spending is paid as a dividend di;t to shareholders:
di;t = pi;tyi;t   Pi;tIi;t (25)
The rm chose Ii;t to equate the expected future marginal gain of investment to the marginal cost. This
implies the following rst-order condition:20
Pi;t = Et(Ci;t+1=Ci;t)
 (Pi;t=Pi;t+1)[pi;t+1i;t+1k 1i;t+1l
1 
i;t+1 + (1  )Pi;t+1]; (26)
The rm chooses the Home and Foreign investment inputs iii;t; i
i
j;t that minimize the cost of generating Ii;t:
This leads to the following intratemporal allocation for investment goods:
iii;t = a
 
pi;t
P Ii;t
! 
Ii;t; i
i
j;t = (1  a)

pj;t
Pi;t
 
Ii;t; j 6= i: (27)
Financial markets and instantaneous budget constraint:
There is now international trade in stocks and (real) bonds. Stocks in country i represents a claim to
its stream of dividends fdi;tg. There is a bond denominated in the Home good, and a bond denominated
in the Foreign good. Buying one unit of the Home (Foreign) bond in period t gives one unit of the Home
(Foreign) good in all future periods. Both bonds are in zero net supply. We denote by Sij;t+1 the number of
shares of stock j held by country i at the end of period t, while Bij;t+1 represents claims held by country i
(at the end of t) to future unconditional payments of good j. At date t, the country i household now faces
the following budget constraint:
Pi;tCi;t + p
S
i;tS
i
i;t+1 + p
S
j;tS
i
j;t+1 + p
B
j;tB
i
j;t+1 + p
B
i;tB
i
i;t+1 (28)
= wi;tli;t + (di;t + p
S
i;t)S
i
i;t + (dj;t + p
S
i;t)S
i
j;t + (pi;t + p
B
i;t)B
i
i;t + (pj;t + p
B
j;t)B
i
j;t; j 6= i;
where pSi;t is the price of stock i and p
B
i;t is the price of bond i.
Household decisions and market clearing conditions
Households' rst-order conditions of that decision problem are still given by (9) and (10). One needs to
add the Euler equations for the two bonds:
1 = Et

Ci;t+1
Ci;t
 
Pi;t
Pi;t+1
pBj;t+1 + pj;t+1
pBj;t
for j = H;F . (29)
20Note that we use the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the country i household for investment decisions in
country i. This assumption is however irrelevant here since up-to the degree of the approximation, the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution of the country i household and the country j household are the same.
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Market-clearing in goods and asset markets now requires:
cHH;t + c
F
H;t + i
H
H;t + i
F
H;t = yH;t ; c
F
F;t + c
H
F;t + i
F
F;t + i
H
F;t = yF;t ; (30)
SHH;t + S
F
H;t = S
F
F;t + S
H
F;t = 1; (31)
BHH;t +B
F
H;t = B
F
F;t +B
H
F;t = 0:
4.2.3 Zero-order equilibrium portfolios
As in section (4.1), equilibrium portfolio holdings (Sii;t+1; S
i
j;t+1; B
i
i;t+1; B
i
j;t+1) can be determined by lin-
earizing the model around its deterministic steady state. With the asset structure here (four assets with four
exogenous shocks), ecient risk sharing can be replicated up to a rst-order (\locally-complete" markets).
Linearization of the model
We use the same notation as in section (4.1). Equations (13) and (14) still hold.
Linearization of the relative demand for investment yI;t  i
H
H;t+i
F
H;t
iFF;t+i
H
F;t
gives (using the intratemporal allo-
cation across investment goods (27)):
dyI;t =  1  (2aI   1)2 bqt + (2a  1)bIt; (32)
where It  IH;t=IF;t is relative real aggregate investment. Holding constant the terms of trade, the relative
demand for Home investment goods, yI;t; increases with relative real investment in the Home country, It;
since Home aggregate investment is biased towards the Home good (a > 12 ).
The relative demand for consumption dyC;t is still dened by (from (15)):
dyC;t =   1  (2a  1)2+ (2a  1)2 1

 bqt   bqt (33)
The market clearing condition for goods (30), together with (32) and (33) implies:
(1  sI)dyC;t + sIdyI;t =  bqt + sI(2aI   1)bIt = byt; (34)
where  = (1 (2a  1)2)+(1 sI) (2a 1)
2
 > 0 and sI  P
I
HIH
pHyH
=
P IF IF
pF yF
is the steady state investment/GDP
ratio.
Not surprisingly, Home terms of trade worsen when the relative supply of Home goods increases, for a
given amount of relative Home country investment. Home terms of trade improve when Home investment
rises (due to home bias in investment spending), for a given value of the relative Home/Foreign output.
Ex-ante symmetry implies that the zero-order portfolios have to satisfy the following conditions: S 
SHH = S
F
F = 1   SFH = 1   SHF ; B  BHH = BFF =  BFH =  BHF . The pair (S;B) thus describes the
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(zero-order) equilibrium portfolio. B denotes a country holdings of bonds denominated in its local good.
B > 0 means that a country is long in local-good bonds (and short in foreign good bonds).
As before there exists a unique portfolio (S;B) that satises the following 'static' budget constraint, for
consumptions that are consistent with the linearized risk sharing condition (14):
Pi;tCi;t = wi;tli;t + Sdi;t + (1  S)dj;t +B(pi;t   pj;t), for i = H;F: (35)
Ecient country i consumption spending at date t equals date t wage income, wi;tli;t; plus the nancial
income generated by the portfolio (S;B)
Subtracting the 'static' budget constraint of country F from that of country H and linearizing gives:21
(1 sI)( \PH;tCH;t  \PF;tCF;t) = (1 sI)(1  1

)(2a  1) bqt| {z }
\RERt
= (1 )dwtlt+(2S   1) ( sI)bdt+2bbqt; b  B=yH ;
(36)
where b = By denotes holdings of debt denominated in local good, divided by steady-state GDP.
Partial equilibrium zero-order portfolios
Like in the previous model, one can derive from the 'static' budget constraint (36) a partial equilibrium
portfolio that sheds light on the hedging terms in terms of covariance-variance ratios. This expression holds
in a large class of models with bonds and equities.
Projection of (36) on bdt and bqt gives the following expression for the portfolio of bonds and equities (S;
b):
S =
1
2
"
1  1  
  sI
Covbq(dwtlt; bdt)
V arbq(bdt) + (1 
1
 )
  sI
Covbq([RER; bdt)
V arbq(bdt)
#
(37)
b =
1
2
"
(1  sI)(1  1

)
Covbd([RER; bqt)
V arbd(bqt)   1    sI Covbd(
dwtlt; bqt)
V arbd(bqt)
#
(38)
where Covbzt( bxt; byt) is the covariance between bxt and byt conditional on the pay-o bzt.
Again, the bonds and equities portfolios depend on the hedging of the two sources of risk: real exchange
rate risk ([RER) and non-tradable income risk (dwtlt). Each portfolio (S and b) is structured such that
investors exploit covariances of the assets pay-os with the two sources of risk. However, there is a key
dierence with the model with equities-only: the covariance of asset payments with the real exchange rate
risk and labor income risk conditional on payments of the other assets matters for the portfolio. This
nding has two main implications.
First real exchange rate hedging should be taken care of by the bond position since bond return dier-
entials across countries are almost perfectly correlated with the real exchange rate (see Coeurdacier and
21We assume  > sI to have strictly positive dividends in the steady-state.
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Gourinchas (2010)). Note that in the present model with real bonds, the correlation is perfect and the
real exchange rate hedging term on the equity position

Covbq([RER; bdt)=V arbq(bdt) will be exactly zero.
Second, while the covariance of local equity returns with returns on non-tradable wealth can be positive
(as in Baxter and Jermann (1997)), this has no implication for the equity portfolio, only the covariance
conditional on bond returns matters. As discussed below, it turns out that the latter tends to be negative
in the data.
General equilibrium zero-order portfolios
We now turn to the zero-order portfolio as a function of the model parameters. Relative labor income
(dwtlt) is still given by: dwtlt = bqt+ byt. Due to the presence of endogenous investment, relative dividends (bdt)
are now given by (using (25)):
bdt = 
  sI (bqt + byt)  sI  sI ( \PH;tIH;t   \PF;tIF;t) =   sI (bqt + byt)  sI  sI ((2a  1) bqt + bIt): (39)
Hence, using (34), we can re-express (36) as follows:
(1 sI)(1  1

) (2a  1) bqt = [(1 )+ (2S   1)]((1 )bqt+sI(2a 1)bIt) sI (2S   1) [(2a  1) bqt+ bIt]+2bbqt
(40)
The asset structure supports full risk sharing, up to rst-order, if (40) holds for all realizations of the two
(relative) exogenous shocks (bt; bt). To solve for that portfolio, we do not have to solve for output and
investment, as a unique pair of terms of trade and relative real investment (bqt; bIt) is associated with each
realizations of (bt; bt).
The following portfolio (S; b) ensures that (40) holds for arbitrary realizations of (bqt; bIt):
S =
1
2

1 +
(2a  1)(1  )
1  (2a  1)

>
1
2
; (41)
b =
1
2
"
(1  sI)(1  1

) (2a  1) + (1  )

  1 + sI(2aI   1)2

1  (2a  1)
#
(42)
The equity portfolio features equity home bias and is the sum of two terms only. The hedging-term for
the real exchange rate is indeed zero in this model since relative price movements are fully hedged by the
appropriate (real) bond position (cross-country dierentials in bond payments are perfectly correlated with
the real exchange rate).
(i) The rst term 12 is still the Lucas (1982) term which prevails in the absence of non-tradable income
risk (! 1)
(ii) The second term (2a 1)(1 )1 (2a 1) is the hedging of non-tradable income risk conditionally on bond pay-
ments: this term is unambiguously positive and drives home equity bias in the model. To understand
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this term, assume a combination of shocks (bt; bt) such that relative investment bIt increases but leaves
the terms-of-trade (bond payments dierential) bqt unchanged. Such a combination of shocks will in-
crease labor demand and labor incomes since investment spending is using more intensively local goods
(a > 1=2).22 In the mean time, dividends net of investment spendings are falling. This generate nega-
tive comovements between labor income and dividends holding relative prices constant (or equivalently
conditional on bond payments dierentials).
The equity portfolio is the same as in Heathcote and Perri (2008) but for any values of the preference
parameters : Heathcote and Perri (2008) considers the same model but with equities and productivity
shocks only. In their benchmark case, parameters are such that  =  =  = 1. With such parameter
values, only uctuations in investment matters for the equity portfolio, for two reasons: (i) uctuations in
output are hedged through terms-of-trade movements (as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991)) due to  = 1;
(ii)  = 1 cancels out any real exchange rate hedging term. As a consequence, with such preferences,
the equity portfolio is the same as in the present model. It is remarkable that compared to equities-only
model, the equity portfolio is remarkably stable to changes in preferences parameters (see Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009)).
The bond portfolio b is also the sum of two terms:
(i) The rst term 12 (1   sI)(1   1 ) (2a  1) is the hedging of real exchange rate risk. This is the desired
exposure to real exchange rate in the absence of non-tradable income risk (! 1). This term is
unambiguously positive since local bonds have higher pay-os when local goods are more expensive.
(ii) The second term
(1 )[ 1+sI(2aI 1)2]
1 (2a 1) is the hedging of non-tradable income risk conditionally on
relative dividend payments: this term can be positive or negative. Roughly speaking, it is negative if
relative wages are positively (resp. negatively) correlated with the terms-of-trade, which happens for
low values of , i.e. low elasticity of substitution  (resp. for high values of , i.e. high elasticity of
substitution ).
4.2.4 Empirical evidence on the hedging of non-tradable income risk
In order to show the relevance of conditioning for bond retursn, we now present some simple empirical
evidence on the hedging of non-tradable risk (see Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2010) for
similar evidence23). The evidence is based on the expression of the portfolio in terms of variance/covariance
ratio (equation (37))
22Note that with a = 1=2, this term is equal to zero since increases in domestic investment changes do not increase more
domestic demand than foreign. Wages increase as much in both countries.
23In a revised version, Heathcote and Perri (2009) also provides similar empirical evidence.
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We use national accounts data for G7 countries to compute the conditional covariance-variance ratio
Covbq(dwtlt; bdt)=V arbq(bdt) for each country. Data are quarterly over the period 1980Q1-2008Q3. We com-
pute relative labor income deviations dwtlt and relative dividend deviations bdt for each country with respect
to the other six countries (wages are computed for each country as the share of output going to labor and
dividends are computed as the share of output going to capital net of investment spending).24 Deviations
are either rst-dierence of the variables or HP-ltered data (smoothing parameter 1600). We compute bond
payments dierentials bq using the (trade-weighted) real exchange rate of one country with respect to the
other six (see appendix for data construction). Note that results are virtually the same when using nominal
exchange rate instead of the real exchange rate (i.e. considering nominal bonds instead of real bonds). We
also report the unconditional covariance-variance ratio

Cov(dwtlt; bdt)=V ar(bdt), the one that matter in an
equity-only model (see equation (18)). As shown in table (2), conditioning for exchange rate movements has
a strong impact on the hedging properties of equities for non-tradable income risk: unconditionally, wages
and dividends comove positively for all countries, which would lead to a very large foreign equity bias in the
equity-only model of section (4.1). Conditionally, wages and dividends comove negatively for all countries,
which lead to a home equity bias in the present equity-bond model. Contrary to Baxter and Jermann
(1997), the presence of bonds makes the international diversication puzzle better than you think, both in
the model and in the data!
CA FR GE IT JP UK US
(1) Cov(
dwtlt; bdt)
V ar( bdt) 0:16(0:041) 0:28(0:064) 0:32(0:067) 0:58(0:065) 0:42(0:052) 0:49(0:057) 0:37(0:065)
(2)
Covbq(dwtlt; bdt)
V arbq( bdt)  0:015(0:014)  0:128(0:015)  0:095(0:025)  0:076(0:030)  0:080(0:019)  0:122(0:026)  0:051(0:020)
(3) Cov(
dwtlt; bdt)
V ar( bdt) 0:08(0:035) 0:47(0:085) 0:33(0:073) 0:33(0:031) 0:46(0:045) 0:39(0:043) 0:55(0:075)
(4)
Covbq(dwtlt; bdt)
V arbq( bdt)  0:032(0:009)  0:139(0:023)  0:135(0:031)  0:011(0:015)  0:097(0:015)  0:084(0:018)  0:070(0:022)
(1) and (2): in rst-dierence; (3) and (4): HP lter
Table (2): The hedging of non-tradable risk: conditional and unconditional covariance-variance ratios
(source: National Accounts Data and IFS)
4.2.5 Related literature
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2010) show in a two country, two good, two period endowment economy
with trade in equities and bonds how bond trading cast doubt on earlier ndings of equities only models.
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2010) show that in many theoretical environments, bonds are used to
hedge real exchange rate uctuations and this is conrmed by the data. Their ndings echo the empirical
results of van Wincoop and Warnock (2008) who show that equities is very poor hedge for real exchange
24We follow Gollin (2002) to allocate mixed-incomes from the national accounts to labor or capital. We assume that the
share of mixed income going to labor is equal to the share of labor income in value added.
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risk, and even more so when trade in nominal bonds (currency forwards) is allowed. As in the present model,
they show that in such environments equities are used to hedge sources of risks that cannot be hedged through
the bond positions, i.e. the part of non-tradable income risk that is orthogonal to bond returns. They
provide evidence in line with table (2) but looking at returns data. Using data on G7 countries, they
show that the unconditional correlation between returns on equity and returns on non-tradable wealth is
very dierent from the conditional one: while the former is positive for all countries (as in Baxter and
Jermann (1997)), the latter is negative (or non-signicant) for all countries.
A similar theoretical point is made in Engel and Matsumoto (2009a) in the specic case of a two
country, two good DSGE model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Assets traded are domestic
and foreign equity and positions in currency forward markets (which are equivalent to nominal bonds).
Uncertainty is driven by productivity shocks and money supply shocks. Due to price rigidity, nominal
exchange rate uctuations are related to real exchange rate uctuations and the forward positions are used to
hedge the nominal exchange rate changes, leaving only a part of the relative price risk to be hedged by equity
positions. The authors show that sucient degrees of price rigidity can generate substantial home bias in
equity positions, as domestic returns to human wealth and domestic equity returns are negatively correlated,
conditional on nominal exchange rate changes. With monopolistic competition and price rigidities, output
is partly demand determined in the short run. Following a local positive productivity shock, labour demand
falls. Wages also fall, leading to a fall in domestic labour income. Mark-ups and prots increase, as, for
the same level of production, labour costs go down. As price rigidities become smaller, we have two eects
lowering home bias. Firstly, prices fall more following a positive productivity shock, increasing output and
pushing up labour demand and wages. Secondly, the nominal and the real exchange rate become less closely
related, making forward contracts less able to hedge uctuations in relative prices. In the extreme case of
full price exibility, we go back to Baxter and Jermann (1997): labor incomes and prots are perfectly
correlated and investors do not take any forward position as they do not want any exposure to purely
nominal risk. Engel and Matsumoto (2009b) generalise the results above to the cases of local bias in
consumption, producer currency pricing and wage rigidity.
Rabhari (2009) develops a two-country DSGE model with price stickiness, endogenous capital accu-
mulation, trade in nominal bonds and equities and endogenous monetary policy. In his setting, equity home
bias is again driven by the motive to hedge human capital risk. Real exchange rate risk is mainly hedged
through bond positions due to price stickiness. He also shows that the combination of price stickiness and
endogenous capital accumulation can produce relative equity returns that are unconditionally positively cor-
related with human capital returns, but conditionaly negatively correlated (controlling for bond returns).
This correlation pattern is conrmed using US data.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007, 2008b) develops a two country, two goods DSGE model with
nominal rigidities a la Calvo, producer currency pricing and endogenous monetary policy. The monetary
authority sets the nominal interest rate in response to changes in producer price ination. There is no local
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bias in consumption and productivity shocks are assumed to be perfectly persistent. The authors consider
dierent asset market structures (portfolio autarky, trade in nominal bonds and trade in nominal bonds and
equity). They can generate home bias in equities for the same reason as Engel and Matsumoto (2008a).
They also nd that monetary policy assumes an additional role in these models. By aecting the returns
on nominal bonds, monetary policy aects portfolios and thus risk sharing. They nd that while monetary
policy has no impact on portfolios with trading in nominal bonds and equities, in the case of bond trading
only, there is an additional motive for price stability. With price stability, cross-country nominal bonds
returns dierentials become more correlated with the real exchange rate, which improves international risk
sharing.
Lastly, Berriel and Bhattarai (2008) solves for equity and nominal bonds portfolios in a standard two-
country general equilibrium model in presence of government spending shocks and nominal shocks (shocks
to the price level): they investigate a new source of non-tradable income risk, namely tax changes. In order
to hedge uctuations in taxes, households exhibit home bias towards local (government) nominal bonds and
local equities. The main mechanism goes as follows: price level shocks at home (increase in home ination)
lowers the value of home government debt and the government can lower taxes (while still satisfying its
intertemporal constraint). Hence, returns on domestic nominal bonds and local taxes co-move positively
and the household prefers to hold local nominal bonds. Government spending shocks lead to an increase in
taxes. In the mean time, as government expenditures are biased towards local goods, the relative price of
locally produced goods increase and so does the pay-o of the claim to local output (local equity). Hence,
returns on local equity and taxes co-move positively and households will optimally bias their portfolio towards
local equity.
4.3 Extensions and shortcomings
4.3.1 Other assets?
The recent literature has shown the importance of extending existing models with a larger menu of assets.
Due to substitution across asset classes (bonds and equities in the previous case), the hedging role of an asset
is modied by the presence of other available types of assets. Thus, an important issue is why we should
restrict our attention to bonds and equities instead of considering an even larger set of assets. There is no
simple answer to this question: potentially any candidate asset that is traded publicly could aect the equity
portfolio if it has some hedging properties on the top of what bonds and equities can achieve. Note that the
empirical tests of these hedging properties based on covariance-variance ratios could be potentially extended
to a larger menu of assets, one just needs to condition for returns on these other potential candidate assets.
In particular, including housing as an additional asset seems a natural extension of existing work.
A related question is the role of corporate debt in these models. We have fully ignored debt as a way
to raise capital for rms and have focused on rms that are fully nanced through equity. Coeurdacier,
Kollmann and Martin (2010) tackle this issue by allowing for an exogenous nancial structure of rms
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in a world of `locally complete' markets. They show that in an environment where the nancial structure is
irrelevant for the value of the rm (when the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies), the presence of corporate
debt has no impact on investment decisions and the equilibrium consumption allocation (up to the rst
order) since markets are complete. Moreover, the equilibrium equity portfolio is also not aected by the
presence of corporate debt. They show that domestic investors will hold a fraction of the corporate debt
issued by domestic rms that is equal to the fraction of stocks of the same rms that they hold. Hence, if the
model delivers home bias in equity, it will also deliver home bias in corporate debt in the same proportion.
The reason is simple: when the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies, investors want a certain exposure to the
total value of the rm which is independent of its nancial structure. In particular, the fraction of the value
of the rm they hold optimally is pinned down in the case where rms are fully nanced through equity.
When rms are partially nanced through debt, holding the same fraction of debt and equity guarantees
that investors have their optimal exposure to the value of the rm. One shortcoming though is that such a
result might not hold if Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply or if nancial markets are incomplete. We
are not aware of any models that pins down international portfolios in a world where the nancial structure
of rm, optimal or not, aects the value of the rm and matters for the real allocation.
4.3.2 Exchange Rates and Asset Prices
While these models can have some sucess in replicating some features of aggregate portfolio data, they
cannot replicate realistic moments for asset prices and exchange rates. They fall on the satndard puzzles
in the nance literature regarding the equity premium, the volatility of asset prices and exchange rates.
This is an important limitation since portfolios should be mirror of asset prices as both are determined in
equilibrium. This does not mean that the mechanisms enlighted in this research do not survive in more
general environments able to generate realistic asset prices but this remains to be done. First attempts in
that direction include Benigno and Nistico (2009) in presence of amiguity aversion and Stathopoulos
(2008,2009) in presence of habit formation. We also believe that targeting asset prices moments should
help disentangling across the dierent potential channels generating portfolio biases.
Another important related shortcoming of this class of models with endogenous portfolio decisions is
that the allocation under perfect risk-sharing is replicated (or almost so), at least up to the degree of the
approximation. This implies an equality between the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption and the real
exchange rate in all states of nature. With standard CRRA preferences, this leads to a perfect correlation
between real exchange rate changes and relative consumption growth (Home relative consumption falls when
Home relative prices are higher; see equation (14) in the previous models). In the data, this is strongly
rejected, the correlation is close to zero and if anything Home relative consumption increases when Home
relative prices are higher: the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly (Kollmann-Backus-Smith puzzle; see
Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995)). The previous models are quite specic in the sense
that the asset structure and the dimension of uncertainty are such that one can replicate up to rst order
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the ecient allocation. One could believe that adding additional sources of uncertainty such that markets
are incomplete even locally would help to solve the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly. It turns out
to be extremely hard to lower the correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate in
models with endogenous portfolio decisions, even under incomplete markets (see Coeurdacier, Kollmann
and Martin (2007) and Benigno and Kucuk-Tuger (2009)). In all existing models with endogenous
portfolio choice, international risk-sharing is still far above what consumption data suggests and this remains
an important challenge for future work.
4.3.3 Dispersion of home bias across time and across countries
Data on home bias exhibit substantial variations across time and across countries (see Figures (1) and (2)
and Table (1)). Most of the work has been dedicated to match the average degree of home bias observed in
developed countries (Collard et al. (2007) and Heathcote and Perri (2008) are notable exceptions:
in line with model predictions, they match the degree of equity bias to the degree of trade openness of
countries). Since more data on aggregate foreign asset holdings are now available, both in the time series
and in the cross-section, this seems natural to extend theories to heterogeneous countries. This would also
provide more accurate tests of the dierent theories available. Exploiting the bilateral dimension of the data
using a multi-country framework could also help in that matter. Indeed, using the CPIS data provided by
the IMF since 2001, one can now observe equity holdings between country pairs. Most of the theoretical
literature has so far limited its attention to models with two symmetric countries, which does not allow to
exploit the bilateral and cross-sectional variations of the data.
A similar point can be made regarding the currency exposure of international portfolios. As shown by
Lane and Shambaugh (2009ab), the currency denomination of foreign assets and liabilities are very
heterogeneous across countries. While, on average, the advanced countries are (in net terms) borrowing
in foreign-currency, some major countries have very large negative domestic-currency debt positions (most
notably this is the case for the US). Models including bond positions denominated in dierent currencies
should be also tested against such data. In section (7), we also provide some evidence on the cross sectional
dispersion of home bias for other asset classes (bonds and banking assets).
5 Asset trade costs in international nancial markets
So far, we have focused on hedging motives as a source of heterogeneity in portfolios assuming frictionless
nancial markets. Another strand of the macroeconomics literature considers frictions in nancial markets
as the main source of heterogeneity across investors. Portfolio home bias is the natural outcome of these
frictions. Such frictions could include xed or proportional transaction costs in foreign portfolio invest-
ments, dierence of tax treatments across domestic and foreign portfolio incomes and other policy induced
restrictions on foreign investments (such as limits to foreign investment and capital controls) (see French
and Poterba (1991), Lewis (1999), Stulz et al. (2003)). Other important frictions to international
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investments are informational frictions. The role of information has been extensively investigated in the
nance literature but less so in the Open Financial Macroeconomics literature (Hatchondo (2008), Tille
and van Wincoop (2009) and Dumas et al. (2009) are recent notable exceptions). For this reason,
we will review the literature on informational frictions (and behavioural biases) in a separate section (see
section (6)).
5.1 Transaction costs would need to be very large to explain equity home bias...
There is a wide debate on the importance of transaction costs to explain international portfolio decisions.
French and Poterba (1991) initially argue in a mean-variance framework that these costs must be much
larger than the one typically observed if one want to rationalize equity home bias. Using stock returns
data from 1975 to 1989 for the US, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Canada, the authors use estimates of a
covariance matrix of returns together with an optimal portfolio rule that is implied by constant relative risk
aversion in order to back out the dierences in expected returns needed to explain actual portfolio shares for
these countries. The implicit excess return on domestic equity implied by observed portfolio holdings is then
interpreted as a measure of the cost of international asset trading needed to generate the observed home bias:
they nd an order of magnitude for these costs of several hundred basis points, too big to be true! Numerous
subsequent studies have provided such indirect estimates of the costs. Most studies are in line with French
and Poterba (1991)'s results and argue that costs need to be very large to explain portfolio holdings (see
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) among others). A notable exception is Sercu and Vanpee (2008) who
nd that, once they control for many factors (currency risk, ination hedging, xed-interest investments,
round-tripping and omitted countries) and allow for time varying covariances, the implicit inward investment
costs are much lower than in earlier studies in developed markets (in the order of magnitude of 0.10-0.20
percent per annum).
Another piece of evidence pointing that transaction costs cannot rationalize portfolio holdings is Tesar
and Werner (1995): transaction costs based explanation of the equity home bias should in general imply
that turnover should be lower for foreign equity holdings than for domestic ones (unless they apply only to
dividend repatriation). Tesar and Werner (1995) nd that turnover is in fact higher for foreign holdings.25
5.2 ...Unless diversication benets are very small
As stated above, transaction costs are often assumed to be small although direct measures of these costs
do not often exist (see below). However, as shown by Martin and Rey (2004) and Coeurdacier and
Guibaud (2009), even small transaction costs may lead to sizable home bias when Home and Foreign
stocks are close substitutes: any small transaction cost is amplied if the benets of diversication provided
by foreign assets are small.
25Rowland (1999) and Amadi and Bergin (2008) construct models that can generate higher turnover for foreign asset holdings
than for domestic ones, in the former case with proportional trading costs, while the latter use xed trading costs.
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Indeed, small diversication benets is a crucial ingredient for the transaction costs based story to
work. A key contribution in this literature is Cole and Obstfeld (1991) who show in the context of
a two country/two good model that gains from international risk sharing are probably quite small, as
changes in the terms of trade help to share risk internationally even with portfolio autarky. The intuition
is simple. Assuming Cobb Douglas preferences over the consumption of the two good, an increase in local
output triggers an equivalent fall their relative prices as local goods are now more abundant (terms-of-
trade adjustment). In this economy portfolio autarky implies perfect correlation of marginal utilities - the
complete market outcome. It is worth noting however, that this argument implies that portfolio would be
indeterminate if trade in equities were possible since home and foreign stocks would be perfect substitutes.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) show that the equivalence between portfolio autarky and complete markets also
obtains in a setting with investment under the following assumptions: i) unitary elasticity of substitution
between the two goods, ii) unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution, iii) full depreciation. For the
no-investment case, the authors calculate welfare gains of moving from autarky to perfect international risk-
sharing. They nd small welfare gains for a broad range of values of the elasticity of substitution between
the two goods. Since the seminal paper of Cole and Obstfeld (1991), a large number of papers using
consumption data have computed welfare gains from international risk sharing with quite a lot of variation
across studies. Van Wincoop (1999) documents the extent to which the results are strongly sensitive
to assumptions about preferences (the coecient of relative risk-aversion and the elasticity of substitution
between traded and nontraded goods), the assumed `autarky' consumption process, the implicitly chosen
risk-free interest rate and the horizon of calculations. Without closing the debate, he tries to narrow the
range of reasonable estimates and does nd signicant gains from risk sharing among OECD countries over
a long horizon: 1.1 to 3.5% of permanent consumption for a 50 year horizon, and 2.5 to 7.5% for a 100 year
horizon.
Overall though, explicit consumption based calculations of the welfare cost of underdiversication tend
to imply low costs. These results are very often driven by the low variability of consumption in the data.
In contrast, costs of underdiversication based on stock returns data are usually much larger, due to the
much larger volatility of stock returns. This point is clearly made by Lewis (2000): she nds that moving
from portfolio equity autarky towards an optimally diversied portfolio (ecient frontier in a mean-variance
framework with a relative risk aversion of 2) leads to a gain of 10 to 30% of current wealth while moving from
autarky consumption to perfect international risk-sharing leads to an increase in permanent consumption of
less than a percent. The gap between the two metrics remains an open question; one will need to reconcile
risk-sharing gains using consumption and asset prices data to fully evaluate the impact of transaction costs
on international portfolios.
Finally, another argument in the literature has been that domestic multinationals already provide benets
of diversication by being active in many countries, reducing the gains from international diversication.
However, Lewis (1999) and Tesar and Rowland (2004) argue that the correlation between the returns
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of multinational and their national stock indices is quite high, thus limiting the diversication benets they
can actually oer.
5.3 Direct measures of the costs?
It is important to note that most existing work provides indirect measures of transaction costs using stock
returns data and observed portfolio allocation (as in French and Poterba (1991)). There are no papers we
are aware of that presents an extensive measure of actual costs in investing in foreign assets. While directly
observed transaction costs on the stock markets are typically very low, they might not be the appropriate
measure for these asset trade costs. For instance, most households go through nancial intermediaries to
invest in stock markets (pension funds, mutual funds...) but there is so far very little empirical evidence
investigating the dierence in fees collected for foreign investments compared to domestic ones.
The question of the role of international taxation also remains opened. For simplicity, we abstract from
taxation issues within multinationals and the eects on international taxation on Foreign Direct Investment
and focus on the taxation of portfolio incomes. When considering the rules of international taxation, one could
expect some large impact on home portfolio biases. First, dividends when repatriated are subject to non-
negligible withholding taxes (of a magnitude of roughly 10% in developed countries). Even if many bilateral
tax treaties lead to some exemptions of these withholding taxes (through tax credits schemes), this is not true
for all investors and these exemptions are often subject to some ceilings. Second, most developed countries
have dividend imputation schemes: capital incomes (prots) are indeed taxed twice in most countries, at the
corporate tax level and at the income tax level (when prots are distributed to shareholders). To avoid this
double-taxation, shareholders receives a tax rebate. The tax rebate is such that, on net, investors end up
paying the income tax only. Such dividend imputation schemes do not apply to foreign asset holdings. This
drives an additional signicant dierential in the taxation of capital incomes coming from domestic or foreign
rms (see Gordon and Hines (2002) and the chapter 10 of the Mirlees Review (2009) for excellent
surveys).26 However, as argued by Gordon and Hines (2002), these tax dierentials might not be eective
in practice since this is very dicult for governments to enforce the taxation on foreign asset incomes. Tax
evasion on income from foreign securities through foreign nancial intermediaries (in tax havens in particular)
might be an issue if one wants to measure exactly the costs associated to international taxation. Hence,
while most papers tend to argue that taxation dierentials between domestic and foreign asset incomes
cannot fully account for the size of portfolio biases, it remains very hard to provide a quantitative estimate
of their impact on portfolio decisions. Studying optimal taxation of capital in a model where home bias is
endogenous would be a very natural extension of the literature. Gaspar and Gordon (2001) provides an
interesting treatment of optimal tax policies in a partial equilibrium model where home bias in equity or
bonds is endogenously generated.
26From a theoretical perspective, Bovenberg and Gordon (1996) show in a model with equity home bias due to asymmetric
information that governments should subsidize capital imports contrary to what is observed in the data.
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6 Informational Frictions and Behavioural Biases
6.1 Informational frictions
6.1.1 Exogenous information sets
The impact of informational asymmetries on portfolio decisions has been rst studied in the nance liter-
ature.27 In this literature, domestic and foreign investors dier on their (exogenously given) information
sets regarding future domestic and foreign stock returns. Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997)
develop a simple two country noisy rational expectations model with one stock per country. They assume
that agents in each country receive a signal on the future performance of each stock but the signal on the
foreign asset is less precise. Hence, domestic investors perceive the foreign stock as riskier and reduce their
foreign stock holdings, which leads to equity home bias. Moreover, Brennan and Cao (1997) show that
less well informed foreign investors respond more strongly to public signals on domestic stocks conveyed by
stock prices. Hence foreign investors buy more of the domestic stocks when the domestic market performs
well. The authors nd evidence for this 'return chasing' eect in the data. Brennan and Cao (2005)
extend their initial work by developing a noisy expectations model where investors receive public and private
information signals. The private signal is less precise for foreign investors. The authors show that there is a
link between information disadvantages and the expectations (degree of bullishness) about a market: foreign
investors tend to become more bullish about a certain market following a positive return on that market.
Pastor (2000) examines whether an investor that updates his views on the distribution of domestic and
foreign returns in a Bayesian fashion may choose a strongly home biased portfolio. He nds that in order
for that to be the case, the investor needs to hold a strong biased prior towards the domestic asset. Albu-
querque et al. (2006) solve for international equity ows when a set of home and foreign investors have
superior information. They argue that this informational heterogeneity within the foreign set of investors is
more important than informational heterogeneity across countries to explain international equity trades. In
line with the data, the model explains why (i) U.S. investors trade in waves, with simultaneous buying and
selling; (ii) U.S. investors change their foreign equity positions gradually; and (iii) U.S. investors increase
their equity position in a country following a raise in its stock price.
The nance literature described above had a recent impact on more standard general equilibrium macro
models along the lines of the Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics approach. Hatchondo (2008)
builds a single good two country model and two assets per country with two departures from standard
models. Firstly, he assumes that only local investors receive informative signals about local assets. This
informational advantage induces agents to invest in the \good" local asset. Secondly, engaging in short
selling is assumed to be costly. When the signal is suciently informative and short selling costs are high
enough, agents do not sell the \bad" local asset short in order to invest more in the \good" local asset but
27Contrary to the standard DSGE macro models, the nance literature described here relies on some partial equilibrium
assumptions: stock returns characteristics (risk and expected returns) are exogenously given and the risk-free asset is in innite
supply.
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rather reduce their holdings of foreign assets. This leads to equity home bias in equilibrium. Bovenverg
and Gordon (1996), present a small open economy model where home bias results from information
asymmetries, which decrease the return home investors get on their foreign capital investment. In such a set
up, subsidizing capital imports is optimal. Razin et al. (1999) assume that domestic investors can observe
the productivity of domestic rms before making their loan decisions, while foreign investors cannot. This
results in foreign underinvestment and domestic oversaving. Building on a similar asymmetric information
set up but adding the possibility of liquidity shocks, Goldstein and Razin (2006) study the trade-o
between FDI and portfolio investment, the latter being more liquid than the former.
Tille and van Wincoop (2009) applies the noisy rational expectations framework from the nance
literature to a standard two country/one good DSGE model. They depart from standard open macro models
by introducing information dispersion across investors. Each investor receives a private signal on the future
fundamentals (productivity) of domestic and foreign stock, the signal on its own stock being more precise (as
in Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997)). The noise is introduced in the form of (unobserved)
stochastic transaction costs to invest abroad which generates portfolio shifts towards or away from foreign
assets. This makes sure that stock prices cannot fully aggregate private signals in equilibrium. These
transaction costs generate equity home bias in equilibrium but this is not the purpose of the paper. They
show that dispersed private information disconnects stock prices from the currently observed fundamental
values but also international capital ows (gross and net). Moreover, capital ows should help forecast future
fundamentals. They nd some empirical support for their results.
6.1.2 Endogenous information acquisition
The early noisy rational expectations literature when applied to international portfolio choice relies on
exogenous information structures. A recent challenge has been to extend it by allowing for endogenous
information acquisition. In this line of research, information is a tool to reduce the conditional variance of the
asset payos. Using a model of rational inattention (Sims (2001)), Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp
(2009) build a model where a tiny information advantage is enough to generate signicant home bias if
investors have a limited capacity to process information. In this model, agents are endowed with a small
informational advantage on the local asset, which lowers its perceived riskiness. Thus, the investor will tend
to hold more of the local asset. However, this eect is amplied as the more of an asset the agent owns, the
more attractive it becomes to learn about the asset. Thus, endogenous and costly acquisition of information
amplies the initial small informational advantage and leads to specialization in local stocks. Learning turns
out to amplify information asymmetries instead of reducing them. In their set up, countries which are learnt
about a lot by investors should have lower returns compared to the prediction of a standard CAPM model,
as lower uncertainty goes hand in hand with a lower return. Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp (2010)
apply variations of their rational inattention model to explain investment strategies of investors, varying the
specication of the preferences or of the information constraint that they face. Depending on the convexity
of the objective function of investors, they can rationalize concentrated or diversied portfolios.
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Mondria (2010) generalizes the information acquisition problem by allowing rationally inattentive
investors to decide not only on the precision but also on the structure of the information they process. In
equilibrium, agents choose to learn not only about individual assets but also about linear combination of
assets, i.e. indices. Such a learning strategy makes sense as the structure of the signal the agents choose
in equilibrium should depend on their objective function. Since investors will choose to hold a somewhat
diversied portfolio in equilibrium, they choose to process information about combinations of assets (they are
interested not only in the volatility of each asset but also in their covariance). Mondria and Wu (2010)
use a similar framework to explain the time series of home bias. When nancial liberalization takes place
in the developed economies in the 1980s, investors start to be able to diversify their portfolios and home
bias decreases but only gradually as investors have an initial information advantage on domestic assets. The
authors show that persistence of asset pay-os and increases in information processing capacity tends to
magnify home bias. By looking at the interaction of capital openness and learning strategies, they are able
to reproduce the time series of home bias.
6.1.3 Empirical evidence on informational frictions
A number of papers regress portfolio holdings or measures of home bias directly on factors that proxy for
information asymmetries. Portes and Rey (2005) shows that physical distance aects international equity
ows and holdings very signicantly: doubling the distance reduces cross-border equity ows by half. Coval
and Moskowitz (1999) nd that U.S. mutual fund managers prefer to invest in nearby rms even within a
country. Ahearne et al. (2004) nd that U.S. holdings of foreign equities are signicantly biased towards
countries that have a higher share of their stock market listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) emphasizes the key role of distance, language and cultural similarities in international
asset allocation. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2008) revisits the impact of distance on cross-border equity
holdings (and bank loans). They nd that the impact of distance is drastically reduced once we control
for bilateral goods trade: countries portfolios are strongly biased towards trading partners (see also Lane
and Milesi Ferretti (2008)). Using instrumental variables, they show that the causality goes essentially
one-way: reducing barriers to trade in goods enhances cross-border asset holdings. However, one cannot
reject the role of goods trade in fostering information ows across borders. Using survey data on Italian
investors, Guiso and Japelli (2006) nd that investors who spend more time to acquire information also
tend to hold less diversied portfolios.
While these explanations, based on an exogenous information structure, have some intuitive appeal,
the question remains why investors may not follow an investment strategy that minimizes the eect of
informational disadvantages, such as investing in index funds. A possible answer to this criticism are the
theoretical models of endogenous information acquisition as in Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp (2008),
who can, under specic assumptions, generate concentrated portfolios. Such models though also imply that
domestic investors should earn a higher return than foreign investors. However, the empirical evidence is
mixed. Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Hau (2001), Dvorak (2005) and Choe et al (2005) nd that
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domestic investors do in fact earn higher returns, while Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Huang
and Shiu (2006) nd the opposite.
6.2 Behavioural biases
Some recent papers have put forward a behavioral explanation for the equity home bias. Using departures
from rational expectations and maximization of standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions used
in standard macro literature, this literature has highlighted some behavioural biases consistent with the data
on international portfolio allocation. The seminal paper of French and Poterba (1991) already consid-
ers overcondence towards local assets as a potential explanation: if investors systematically have higher
expectations of relative returns for domestic equities, this dierence in expected returns, while inconsistent,
can overturn any perceived diversication gains. In the same vein, Shiller et al. (1991) document large
dierences in expected returns of Japanese and U.S. investors for the same stockmarkets. They nd that
Japanese investors tend to expect relatively higher returns for Japanese stocks, while U.S. investors expect
higher returns on U.S. equity. A similar argument can be applied to estimated variances (either the standard
deviation of domestic equity is systematically believed to be lower or correlations with foreign equities are
overestimated). Studies by Huberman (2001), Benartzi (2001) and Karlsson and Norden (2007)
(see also Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a survey) suggest that `familiarity' might be the main determi-
nant of portfolio choice: investors choose `familiar' assets while ignoring the principles of portfolio theory.
However, it remains extremely dicult to disentangle empirically informational frictions linked to distance
from `familiarity' eects. Solnik (2006) explains the equity home bias by the Regret Theory: investors
use the domestic portfolio as a benchmark and feel the pain when their foreign investments underperform.
Morse and Shive (2006) nd that home bias is empirically related to measures of patriotism.
To our knowledge, building on Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2007), Dumas, Lewis and Osambela
(2009) are the rst ones to develop a standard two-country general equilibrium model (in continuous time)
where investors exhibit behavioural biases in the form of dierences in their beliefs. Investors have access
to the same information set (no assymmetric information) but dier in their beliefs about the information
contained in economic public signals: local investors trust more the information contained in local signals
and incorrectly believe that the information in the foreign signal is partly noise. These assymmetric beliefs
help the authors to solve for some anomalies at the international level: investors exhibit home equity bias,
asset prices are the combination of a local CAPM and an international CAPM (in line with the empirical
evidence of Bekaert and Harvey (1995)) and as in models of asymmetric information (see Brennan and
Cao (2005)), capital ows towards a country covary positively with returns in that country. Their model
with dierences in beliefs is indeed observationally equivalent to existing models of segmented markets due
to assymmetric information.
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7 New Portfolio Facts
7.1 Aggregate Data on Portfolio Holdings
The Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics models have implications for international bond holdings
as well as international equity holdings. Hence, we provide some measure of the extent of risk-sharing
through international bonds holdings (public and private) for a large cross section of countries by using
data on cross-border bond holdings. For completeness we also present some data on international bank
lending, as we expect that the Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics will soon incorporate formally
bank intermediation in their models. For these data, we rely on CPIS and IFS data from the IMF and the
data from the BIS (see appendix for a detailed description of the data).
7.1.1 Cross-Border Bond Holdings
We use data form IFS and BIS to compute international bond holdings for selected countries. Unfortunately,
available data do not allow to disaggregate data of foreign bond holdings across types of bonds (corporate
versus public, across maturities, across currency denomination)28 and we had to focus on bond holdings
aggregates.
To measure the degree of international diversication of bond portfolios, we compute a measure of home
bias in bond holdings similar to the one we computed for equity holdings. Hence, our measure of Bond Home
Bias for country i (BHBi) is dened as follows:
BHBi = 1  Share of Foreign Bonds in Country i Bond Holdings
Share of Foreign Bonds in the World Bond Market Portfolio
(43)
In gure (3), we show the evolution of bond home bias measures in developed countries across regions
of the world: it has decreased over the last twenty years with the process of `nancial globalization' but
remains still very high in all countries. Portfolios exhibit a home bias in bond holdings of a slightly larger
magnitude than the one documented for equity in section (2). On average across the world, the degree of
home bias across the world is 0.75 (like for equities lower in Europe where monetary union seemed to have
had an eect but higher in other countries),29 meaning that the share of foreign bonds in investors portfolios
roughly a 1/4 of what investors would hold if they were holding the world bond market portfolio. Despite
a large degree of home bias, these data indicates that some international risk-sharing occurs through bond
holdings and it seems necessary to incorporate cross-border bond holdings in the theoretical portfolios model
we are using. In gure (4), we show the degree of bond home bias for emerging markets: emerging markets
have even much less diversied bond portfolios than developed countries and it has barely decreased over
the last decade. Like for equities, there is a signicant dispersion of bond home bias across countries (and
across time) that could be helpful to guide future theoretical work.
28For more details on the currency denomination of foreign assets and liabilities, see Lane and Shambaugh (2009 ab).
29see Lane (2006), Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) and Fidora et al. (2007) for studies on the impact of the euro
on cross-border bond diversication.
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Figure 3: Measures of Home Bias in Bonds across developed countries (the country measure BHBi is Market
Capitalization-weighted for each region; source: BIS and IFS. See appendix for the list of countries included)
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Figure 4: Measures of Home Bias in Bonds across emerging countries (the country measure BHBi is Market
Capitalization-weighted for each region; source: BIS and IFS. See appendix for the list of countries included)
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7.1.2 Cross-Border Bank Loans
We use data from the BIS and the OECD to compute cross-border banking assets for selected countries.
Like for bonds, available data do not allow to disaggregate data of foreign bank loans across types of loans
and we had to focus on aggreagte foreign asset holdings by banks.
To measure the degree of international diversication of banks' portfolios, we compute a measure of home
bias in bank loans comparable to the one used for equities and bonds. Hence, our measure of Home Bias in
Loans for country i (LHBi) is dened as follows:
LHBi = 1  Share of Foreign Banking Assets in Country i Banking Assets
Foreign Banking Assets as a share of Total Foreign Outstanding Loans
(44)
In gure (5), we show the evolution of home bias in bank loans measures across OECD countries using
OECD data. Figure (6) shows the same statistic but using BIS statistics (available for a larger number
of countries but over a shorter time period; see appendix for a detailed descritpion of the data). Despite
an increased diversication, banking portfolios still exhibit a very strong home bias. The magnitude of the
home bias in banking assets is similar to the one observed for equity holdings. Like for equities and bonds,
the degree of Home Bias is the smallest in Europe (potentially due to the EMU) and the largest in emerging
markets (here Latin America).
7.2 Institutional Investors Home Bias Data
An increasing share of capital ows are intermediated through institutional investors. For example, using the
Survey of Consumer Finance, Polkovnichenko (2004) documents that in 2001, 62% of all equity holdings
by US households were indirect holdings. Information asymmetries explanations of the home bias seem
more plausible for households than for fund managers, who can devote a substantial amount of resources
to gather relevant information. Also, if home bias can be explained by the degree of sophistication of
investors regarding their investment strategies, one would expect that professional investors should be fully
aware of the theoretical benets of diversication. Furthermore, with delegated investment comes an agency
problem and the incentives of the nal investor and of the fund manager are not necessarily well aligned. It
should therefore be informative to look at portfolio allocations at the fund level to understand better the
determinants of home bias. Hau and Rey (2008) provides some descriptive statistics on domestic and
foreign holdings of mutual funds in 4 countries. We use the same data set - data of global equity holdings
from Thomson Financial Securities (TFS)- to estimate home bias at the fund level on a larger cross section of
countries. The data document individual mutual funds holdings at the stock level. TFS was created by the
merger of The Investext Group, Security Data Company and CDA/Spectrum. The data cover the ve year
period 1997 to 2002 and has an interesting cross sectional and time series dimension.30 The TFS holding data
comprise fund number, fund name, management company name, country code of the fund incorporation,
30Chan et al. (2005) used a similar dataset -albeit only for one year. They aggregated the data across all funds to document
home bias at the country level.
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stock identier, country code of the stock, stock position (number of stocks held), reporting dates for which
holding data is available, security price on the reporting date and the security price on the closest previous
days in case the reporting date had no price information on the security, total return index (including
dividend reinvestments) in local currency, and daily dollar exchange rates for all investment destinations.
Most funds report only with a frequency of 6 months. Reporting dates dier somewhat, but more than 90
percent of the reporting occurs in the last 30 days of each half-year. A limitation of the data is that they
do not include any information on cash holdings, nancial leverage, investments in xed income instruments
or investments in derivative contracts. The portfolio characteristics we calculate therefore concern only the
equity proportion of a fund's investment. Table 1 gives the breakdown of the average market capitalization
over the sample in billions of dollars by country of fund origin. Table 2 gives the breakdown of the average
number of funds also by country of fund origin.
Graph 1 present the percentage of mutual funds based in a given country whose shares of domestic
holdings in total asset holdings is 0%, strictly larger than 0% but smaller than 10%, between 10 and 20%,
.., between 90 and 100% (but strictly below 100%) and equal to 100%. The numbers are averages for the
1997-2002 period. To simplify, we call these dierent shares of domestic holdings in total holdings "dierent
degrees of home bias". For each country, the percentages are based on number of funds in a given home bias
category out of the total number of funds for that country and on the share of the market capitalization of
funds in a given category relative to the total market capitalization of funds of that country. Thus, funds
may change from one home bias category to another over the course of the sample.
The most striking stylized fact may be that there is a great deal of heterogeneity both across countries
and within country in the extent of domestic holdings in total holdings. For most countries, the distribution
usually exhibits peaks at 0% and 100% (or between 0 and 10% and between 90 and 100%) indicating sub-
stantial specialization of funds into either (close to) fully domestic or (close to) fully international investment.
But, interestingly, there is a non negligible part of the distribution lying in between those two extremes,
indicating a great deal of heterogeneity in diversication choices by the fund managers even within country.
Thus one conjecture is that the observed investment pattern at the fund level reects both some increasing
returns in the information technology leading to some concentration in stock holdings of either domestic or
foreign countries and a particular market structure inducing product dierentiation at the fund level. As
mentioned in Hau and Rey (2008), there is a positive correlation between the number of sectors and the
number of countries funds invest in, suggesting that more diversied funds diversify both across sectors of
activity and across countries. Larger funds tend also to be the most diversied. The role of fund mandates in
the observed asset holdings is of course of great interest. We nd that for example, in 2002, 701 funds out of
our 1,291 US funds had some kind of explicit mandates, which could range from "investing in world equities"
to "primarily small cap north American companies" or "at least 80% in Latin American companies". These
mandates seem to exhibit considerable variations across countries and are clearly not exogenous. They too
result from the optimizing behaviour of nancial companies. Explaining home bias or indeed investment
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strategies at the fund level thus probably requires a theory of fund mandates.
8 Conclusions and leads for future research
Our view is that the home bias puzzle is now less of a puzzle. From the literature we labeled \Open Economy
Financial Macroeconomics" to the rational inattention models featuring endogenous information acquisition,
notable progress has been made to understand the determinants of portfolio allocations. We may now be at
a stage where we should be studying a broad array of implications of these new models rather than focusing
only on the stylized fact of home bias. Confronting their predictions with a large set of other stylized facts
on portfolio holdings will surely lead us to rene them further and ultimately assess their true explanatory
power.
The Open Economy Financial Macroeconomics literature has an interesting set of predictions on the
holdings of a broad menu of nancial assets. It should be very fruitful to introduce in that literature some
more detailed models of the capital structure of rms and to get ner empirical implications for corporate
debt, equity and government debt holdings in particular. One major issue going forward will be the modelling
of the ocial sector. Introducing an optimal monetary or scal policy and modelling their interactions with
endogenous portfolio choices of the private sector is a major challenge. It is likely that as a rst step
focusing on realistic but not necessarily optimal monetary policy or scal rules will be the way to go. It is an
important goal to have realistic and workable macroeconomic models of the open economy with endogenous
portfolio choice, as large cross border holdings of assets (see Gourinchas and Rey (2007a)) are likely to
aect the channels of transmission of monetary and scal policy. Understanding the short run dynamics of
the exchange rate, a formidable but crucial task, is also intimately linked to agents portfolio choices and
gross external positions as shown in Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) and Della Corte et al. (2009).
Furthermore, a closer look at the maximization problems faced by Central Banks when they decide on their
reserve holdings and by sovereign wealth funds would be warranted as both actors now account for a non
trivial share of international capital ows. The portfolio choice of the ocial sector is also an important
determinant of the international use of a currency. The dollar market share in world transactions and the
"exorbitant privilege" of the United States may be challenged by the new portfolio diversication strategies
of emerging markets in general and China in particular. We have few models which can tackle these issues
in a general equilibrium set up with a rich asset structure. The role of international currencies and their
importance in determining portfolios and asset price movements is an area of active research (see Devereux
and Shi (2009) or Gourinchas et al. (2010)).
As more detailed survey data on households become available, one will also be better able to test at the
microeconomic level the empirical relevance of various hedging motives underlying the mechanism of these
Open Economy Financial Macroeconomic models. Estimating the correlation of labour income risk with
various asset returns at a disaggregated level - for instance according to levels of wealth- would probably
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enhance our understanding of the plausibility of the mechanisms. Importantly, introducing models with
heterogeneous agents in an international economics set up seems a priority to understand better some of the
most stubborn puzzles of international economics such as the Consumption-Real Exchange Rate anomaly
(Kollmann-Backus-Smith puzzle). Limited participation in asset markets is a promising way to help resolve
some asset pricing puzzle as shown in particular in the context of a closed economy by Guvenen (2009).
Some steps have been taken by Kollmann (2009) and by Coeurdacier et al. (2010) in particular to
introduce limited participation in an open economy set up. Furthermore, much like the closed economy
macroeconomics literature, the modeling of nancial intermediaries is a key missing building bloc in our
current DSGE models of the open economy. As the literature stands, we have nothing interesting to say
about leveraged intermediaries for example and their role in the international transmission of shocks.
If we want to take a more detailed microeconomic view of the home bias, we have to recognize the large
heterogeneity of investment strategies both at the household level and at the fund manager level. A large
share of household investment is not direct portfolio holdings but intermediated. In the US, according to
the Survey of Consumer Finance (see Polkovnichenko (2004)), the share of equity held indirectly by
households through mutual funds, pension funds or other investment vehicles has risen from about 46% in
1989 to close to 62% in 2001. The Federal Reserve Bulletin (2009) indicates that between 2004 and
2007, the fraction of families holding publicly traded stocks rose to 51.1 percent. Among families that held
equity, either directly or indirectly, in 2007, ownership through a tax-deferred retirement account was most
common (84% of families), followed by direct holdings of stocks (35% of families), direct holdings of pooled
investment funds (21% of families), and managed investment accounts (8% of families). If we take a dierent
angle and look at the total amount of equity, 37.8 percent was held in tax-deferred retirement accounts, 33.6
percent as directly held stocks, 22.1 percent as directly held pooled investment funds, and 6.5 percent as
other managed assets. Strikingly if we look at the families holding stocks directly 36% of them hold only
1 stock and 48% hold between 2 and 9 stocks. The typical portfolio of households who participate in the
nancial market is therefore very dichotomic: it contains a very small number of stocks, which are directly
held and a more diversied stock portfolio, which is usually managed by a third party. It is still a major
challenge for the existing literature to reproduce such a dual investment strategy at the household level. It
is even more of a challenge to reproduce it together with the great heterogeneity in investment strategies
at the fund level that we documented in Graph 1. The endogenous information acquisition literature (see
Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp (2010)) seems promising since in the presence of increasing returns
to information acquisition, it is possible to generate concentrated portfolios, a prediction which accords
well with the directly held portion of household equities. It should however probably be enriched with a
model making explicit delegated portfolio management strategies. A rst step in this direction has been
taken by Mondria and Dziuda (2010). In their paper, asymmetrically informed households delegate
their investment decisions to fund managers of stochastic abilities. Since domestic households know more
about home country assets, they are better able to evaluate the performance of managers investing in home
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assets. Hence more highly skilled managers, who benet from transparency, are more likely to operate
in domestic markets. Therefore a small information asymmetry at the household level is able to generate
home bias due to the endogenous decision of skilled fund managers to operate in the domestic market.
This framework however cannot generate the heterogeneous distribution of investment strategies observed
at the fund level. It also does not have anything to say regarding the determinants of funds mandates and
benchmarks. It would be interesting to explain the determinants of the distribution of funds mandates across
countries for example, as it seems to exhibit considerable heterogeneity. It is likely that the literature on
endogenous information acquisition and delegated investment still misses an important component of the
incentives of fund managers, which could be marketing and product dierentiation. Some more data on the
number and type of distinct funds owned by each households would be necessary to fully understand the
tradeos. There is little doubt however that understanding better delegated investment strategies and the
constraints and incentives of fund managers would be an important step to study the extent and time series
variation of international risk sharing, the international transmission of nancial shocks and the propagation
of crises. Recent work by Pavlova and Rigobon (2009) is a rst step in that direction: they show
how regulatory constraints and investment mandates can generate nancial contagion through cross-border
portfolio decisions. More generally, a promising avenue of research would be to study optimal regulatory or
taxation policies in environment featuring endogeneous asymmetric information or principal agent problems
due to delegated investment.
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Table1: MARKET CAPITALIZATION (AVERAGE FOR 1997:1 TO 2002:2) - BN DOLLARS
United States Germany United Kingdom Canada Switzerland France
2851 225.8 174.6 84.81 74.18 53.43
Sweden Hong Kong Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium
43.84 26.22 26.03 21.52 12.88 12.55
Japan Singapore Luxembourg Ireland South Africa Norway
11.96 9.052 6.35 6.215 3.076 2.559
Table2: NUMBER OF FUNDS (AVERAGE FOR 1997:1 TO 2002:2)
United States Germany United Kingdom Canada Switzerland France
3165 1223 495 353 140 212
Sweden Hong Kong Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium
168 66 74 231 66 101
Japan Singapore Luxembourg Ireland South Africa Norway
48 47 54 26 35 34
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Home Bias Data (Figure (1) and Table (1))
Source: CPIS (IMF) and FBIV
- Japan
- Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Nehterlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
- North America: Canada and United States
- Oceania: Australia and New Zealand
60
